# PWBM WORKING PAPER SERIES 

Fiscal and Generational Imbalances in the U.S. Federal Budget

Agustin Diaz*, Jagadeesh Gokhale*, and Kent A. Smetters*<br>* Penn Wharton Budget Model, University of Pennsylvania<br>Working Paper 2022-2<br>https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/issues/2022/6/22/w2022-2

PENN WHARTON BUDGET MODEL
3440 Market Street, Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19104
June 2022

We are grateful to our colleague Jinjing Yang for research assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Penn Wharton Budget Model.

PWBM working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer reviewed or been subject to review by PWBM.
© 2022 by Agustin Diaz, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Kent A. Smetters. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.


#### Abstract

The Penn Wharton Budget Model's microsimulation, which projects detailed future demographic changes consistent with past trends, is used to construct estimates of the U.S. federal fiscal and generational imbalances. The federal government's fiscal imbalance (FI) calculated under current fiscal laws and purchases policies over the next 75 years equals $\$ 104.3$ trillion, which is 8.0 percent of the present value of projected GDP (PVGDP) over that time horizon. Calculated in perpetuity, FI equals $\$ 244.8$ trillion, which is 10.2 percent of PVGDP, also calculated in perpetuity. The FI/PVGDP ratio in perpetuity would be 11.5 percent under extension of provisions that are scheduled to expire under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.

Over the next 75 years, current-law FI as a share of the present value of federal expenditures equals 31.2 percent. As a share of the present value of federal revenues, it equals 41.5 percent. These figures are 35.5 percent and 52.7 percent, respectively, when calculated in perpetuity. When estimated in perpetuity, total federal debt outstanding ( $\$ 27.5$ trillion) accounts for 1.1 percent, Social Security plus Medicare Part A ( $\$ 106.6$ trillion) for 4.4 percent, and public purchases ( $\$ 143.2$ trillion) for 5.9 percent of FI as a share of PVGDP. Other federal transfer programs net of all non-payroll-tax receipts ( $\$ 32.5$ trillion) contribute a surplus of 1.4 percent of FI as a share of PVGDP.

The generational imbalance (GI) measure for Social Security and Medicare Part A - which shows the present value of net benefits in excess of taxes paid by past and currently alive generations equals $\$ 60.2$ trillion. The imbalance on account of future-born generations equals $\$ 46.4$ trillion. The paper provides a detailed breakdown of the distribution of prospective taxes net of transfers in present value (generational accounts) for population groups by birth-year, gender, race, and education.


Key Words: Taxation, Government Spending, National Debt, Fiscal Imbalance, Generational Accounting JEL Classification Numbers: H2, H5, H6

## 1. Introduction

The United States' federal government performs many functions: delivering public goods and services such as national defense and social insurance to the population and safety net transfers to the economically vulnerable. A key question about federal finances is whether government spending commitments could be met out of resources generated under current fiscal laws. If projected government spending significantly exceeds government receipts under current laws, those laws contain a structural imbalance, which we call the fiscal imbalance (FI).

The measurement of FI involves comparing the present discounted value of all projected social transfers and federal purchases of public goods and services with the sum of the government's net assets plus the present discounted value of government receipts (taxes, tolls, fines, premiums etc.). Budget balance need not hold in every year: Expenditures may be partly funded out of borrowing. But the debt created must be repaid or serviced through future surpluses of receipts over non-interest expenditures. Comparing projected non-interest expenditures and receipts in present-value terms and including the government's current net assets accounts for the interest costs on government debt.

Our projection of government expenditures and resources produces a value of FI equal to $\$ 244.8$ trillion, which is 10.2 percent of the present value of GDP when both figures are calculated in perpetuity. This federal resource shortfall must eventually be addressed by changing laws governing federal expenditures and receipts. The size of FI relative to the present value of national output (alternatively, of expenditures or receipts) indicates the extent of fiscal adjustments needed. The following sections describe the construction of the FI for the U.S. government and report its size. The measurement of FI is based on federal expenditures and receipts projected by assuming that current fiscal laws and public goods share of national output will remain unchanged through the measurement's time horizon. As such, it does not represent an unconditional forecast of future fiscal outcomes. ${ }^{1}$

[^0]
## 2. The Fiscal Imbalance Measure

Our construction of FI is based on U.S. demographic and economic projections of PWBM"s microsimulation, which projects the evolution of the U.S. population along many dimensions. ${ }^{2}$ In addition, calculations are based on data on federal debt from the U.S. Treasury, budget projections from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and profiles of tax and transfer distributions by age, gender, race, and lifetime educational attainment. The latter are developed from various U.S. micro-data surveys. The construction of each of these elements is described in the Appendix. Federal budget projections and FI measures are compared to GDP projections, which are also based on PWBM's microsimulation as described in the Appendix.

From these inputs, we calculate FI as the sum of four components: The first is the government's initial net assets. Since federal debt outstanding - the sum total of annual budget deficits accrued from the past - is positive, the government's initial net asset position is negative. United States' federal debt stood at 79.2 percent of annual U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the end of 2019. Debt-funded expenditures to counter the negative economic effects of Covid-19 during 2020-21 boosted federal debt to beyond 100 percent of annual GDP by the end of $2021 .^{3}$

The second component of FI is the present value of the government's expenditure obligations net of dedicated resources for two of the largest social insurance programs: Social Security Old Age,

[^1]Survivors and Disability Insurance and Medicare Hospital Insurance (collectively OASDHI).
Expenditures on OASDHI benefits are paid for out of dedicated resources: Payroll taxes, income taxes on OASDHI benefits, and redemptions, when needed, of treasury securities held in those programs' trust funds. The FI measure includes the present valued difference between current-law OASDHI expenditures and current-law resources dedicated to OASDHI. ${ }^{4}$

A noteworthy feature of the OASDHI component is Medicare Part A's expenditure growth.
Historically, prices of health care goods and services have increased faster than those of other goods and services. The differential rate of health care price increases relative to general inflation is 1.9 percent per year. ${ }^{5,6}$ The key reasons for faster price increases of health care goods and services are in rising demand from income growth, broader coverage under government health insurance programs, and population aging. In addition, technological advances that generate better but more expensive health care treatments promote faster price increases in the health care sector. Since these factors appear unlikely to abate in the near future, we assume that faster health care inflation will continue through the year 2040. Thereafter, excess health care costs per capita are assumed to decline gradually until 2060. After year 2060, health care expenditures per capita are assumed to grow at the same rate as other federal expenditures - at the rate of labor productivity growth. The eventual reduction in excess health care cost growth is predicated on limits to technological advancements, eventual reluctance by consumers to spend ever-larger shares of their budgets on health care goods and services, and the adoption of cost control measures by policymakers to prevent health care expenditures from crowding out other federal spending. ${ }^{7}$

[^2]The third component of FI includes the difference between federal non-OASDHI transfers and non-OASDHI receipts: Non OASDHI transfers are governed by current laws about eligibility and benefit levels but are funded out of federal general-account tax revenues, program-specific premiums ("offsetting receipts") and other non-tax receipts. ${ }^{8}$ FI includes the difference between projected non-OASDHI expenditures and general-account (non-OASDHI) receipts, both projected under current fiscal laws.

One noteworthy feature of the Congressional Budget Offices' projections of several nonOASDHI expenditures is the inclusion of expenditures not yet appropriated by Congress. For example, the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program is scheduled to expire in 2023 but is expected to be reauthorized in 2022. Such expenditures are included in CBO's baseline 10-year projections under the assumption that "current laws governing taxes and spending would generally remain in place" during the current fiscal year and for the ensuing 10 years. ${ }^{9}$ We use CBO's baseline budget projections during the first decade for distribution across PWBM's projected U.S. population by race, gender, and lifetime education.

The fourth component of FI is the present value of "discretionary" public goods and services purchases. These include expenditures on national defense, infrastructure, research and development, administration, foreign affairs, and other government functions. These "public purchases" levels are determined by Congress and the Administration through the annual appropriations process. We characterize current policy on purchases as increasing spending per capita at the rate of projected labor productivity growth. ${ }^{10}$ Since labor productivity growth is the main driver of GDP growth, projected growth in federal public purchases (under our characterization of current policy) keeps pace with GDP

[^3]growth. The present value of public goods and services purchases is netted against particular (mostly nontax) receipts associated with that provision (service charges, tolls, fines, premiums etc.).

### 2.1 U.S. Fiscal Imbalance Measured under Current Law

Table 1 shows our estimates of FI and its components as present discounted values in constant 2021 dollars. Present discounted values are calculated over two time horizons - through 2095 and in perpetuity. The Table also shows FI and its components as a share of the present discounted value of projected U.S. Gross Domestic Product (PVGDP). PWBM's projection of GDP and its discounted present value (PVGDP) are based on its projections of annual efficiency-adjusted labor hours and the U.S. productive capital stock as described in the Appendix. ${ }^{11}$

|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Assets(+)/ } \\ \text { Debt(-) } \\ \text { (A) } \end{gathered}$ | 75-year Projections |  |  | Assets(+)/ Debt(-) <br> (A) | Infinite Horizon Projections |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Receipts <br> (R) | Expenditures (E) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { FI (E- } \\ & \text { R-A) } \end{aligned}$ |  | Receipts <br> (R) | Expenditures (E) | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \text { FI (E- } \\ & \text { R-A) } \end{aligned}$ |
|  | Present values in trillions of constant 2021 dollars* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| U.S. Treasury | $-27.5 * * *$ |  |  | 27.5 | $-27.5 * * *$ |  |  | 27.5 |
| OASDHI | 3.0 ** | 86.8 | 126.2 | 36.3 | 3.0 ** | 159.7 | 269.4 | 106.6 |
| non-OASDHI | $3.1 * *$ | 162.9 | 128.9 | -37.0 | 3.1 ** | 301.8 | 272.3 | -32.5 |
| Public Purchases |  | 1.8 | 79.3 | 77.5 |  | 3.4 | 146.6 | 143.2 |
| Net Value | -21.4 | 251.5 | 334.5 | 104.3 | -21.4 | 464.9 | 688.4 | 244.8 |
| Memo: OASDI | 2.9 | 63.2 | 87.9 | 21.8 | 2.9 | 116.7 | 183.4 | 63.9 |
|  | As a percent of PVGDP* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| U.S. Treasury | -2.1 *** |  |  | 2.1 | -1.1 *** |  |  | 1.1 |
| OASDHI | 0.2** | 6.7 | 9.7 | 2.8 | 0.1 ** | 6.6 | 11.2 | 4.4 |
| non-OASDHI | $0.2 * *$ | 12.5 | 9.9 | -2.8 | 0.1 ** | 12.5 | 11.3 | -1.4 |
| Public Purchases |  | 0.1 | 6.1 | 6.0 |  | 0.1 | 6.1 | 5.9 |
| Net Value/PVGDP | -1.6 | 19.3 | 25.7 | 8.0 | -0.9 | 19.3 | 28.6 | 10.2 |
| Memo: OASDI | 0.2** | 4.9 | 6.8 | 1.7 | 0.1 ** | 4.8 | 7.6 | 2.7 |
| Memo: PVGDP | 1,300.3 |  |  |  | 2,410.0 |  |  |  |

Table 1: 75-year and infinite horizon FI measures under current fiscal laws and purchases policies. Source: Authors' calculations.

* Present values calculated at a nominal discount rate of 4.4 percent.
** Intragovernmental debt for Social Security, Medicare, and other programs.
*** Gross federal debt.

[^4]
## FI Measured over the next 75 Years

According to our estimates, the federal government faces a financial shortfall equal to $\$ 104.5$ trillion through the next 75 years (2021-95), or 8.0 percent of the present value of GDP (PVGDP) over that time span. The programmatic view of components of the total shortfall is obtained by considering entries under the FI column of Table 1. Consider, first, projections through 2095. Public purchases at current rates out of GDP constitute the largest amount - $\$ 77.5$ trillion in present value through 2095 or 6.0 percent of PVGDP. This provision would be paid for out of resources that remain after funding all federal transfer commitments under current fiscal laws. The OASDHI component, however, contains a resource shortfall ( $\$ 36.3$ trillion or 2.8 percent of PVGDP). The balance on current-law non-OASDHI transfers net of non-payroll tax and non-tax revenues (except the small amounts of offsetting receipts on public purchases) generates a surplus ( $\$ 37.0$ trillion, or 2.8 percent of PVGDP). This amount simply offsets the shortfall on account of OASDHI with nothing remaining to pay for debt service and public purchases at current levels as a share of GDP. The total resource shortfall amounts to $\$ 104.3$ trillion or 8.0 percent of PVGDP.

The unified budget view of FI is obtained by considering column totals shown in the "Net Value" row. Outstanding debt held by the public ( $\$ 21.4$ trillion or 1.6 percent of PVGDP) plus federal expenditures on all FI components ( $\$ 334.5$ trillion or 25.7 percent of PVGDP) amounts to $\$ 355.8$ trillion (27.3 percent of PVGDP) whereas all tax and non-tax revenues generate only $\$ 251.5$ trillion (19.3 percent of PVGDP) in federal resources under current federal fiscal laws and public purchases policy.

## Comparison of the 75-year FI measure with Federal Agency Estimates

Our FI measure calculated over 75 years (through 2095) is slightly larger than that reported in the Financial Report ("Report") of the federal government for fiscal year 2021. ${ }^{12}$ The Report's Statement of Long-Term Fiscal Projections (SLTFP) shows that the "present value (PV) of total "noninterest

[^5]spending over the next 75 years under current policy is projected to exceed the PV of total receipts by $\$ 97.6$ trillion." This estimate is reasonably close to that reported in this study (\$104.3 trillion). ${ }^{13}$

Our measure of OASDHI's FI can be split into those for OASDI and HI. Our 75-year FI estimate for OASDI is $\$ 21.8$ trillion (or 1.7 percent of the 75 -year PVGDP; see Memo lines in Table 1) - similar in magnitude to the $\$ 19.8$ trillion reported by the Social Security Trustees in 2021. ${ }^{14}$ Finally, our 75-year FI estimate for Medicare Part A is $\$ 14.5$ trillion, considerably larger than the official estimate of $-\$ 10.0$ trillion reported by the Medicare Trustees. ${ }^{15}$

## Fiscal Imbalance Measured in Perpetuity

The FI measure calculated in perpetuity - which presents a comprehensive measure of the budget's structural resource shortfall - is even larger. The infinite horizon FI equals $\$ 244.8$ trillion or 10.2 percent of PVGDP. Over the longer horizon, the non-OASDHI surplus of 32.5 trillion is woefully inadequate to cover the shortfalls in OASDHI (\$106.6 trillion), public purchases at current rates (\$143.2 trillion) and outstanding federal debt ( $\$ 27.5$ trillion). The reasons for the larger total shortfall over the longer time horizon becomes clear when we consider trajectories of accruing annual budget shortfalls even just though the year 2095.

[^6]Panel-A of Figure 1 shows time profiles of projected annual federal non-interest expenditures, receipts, and deficits through year 2095 (non-interest expenditures minus receipts) as percentages of annual GDP. Panel-B of the Figure shows annual deficits as a share of annual non-interest expenditures and receipts.


Figure 1: Projected federal deficits as shares of GDP, federal receipts, and noninterest expenditures under current fiscal laws and purchases policy.
Source: Authors' calculations.

The high GDP shares of non-interest expenditures and the deficit and the low GDP share of revenues during 2021 resulted from anti-Covid-19 federal spending and depressed employment and income. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the post-Covid-19 economic recovery will reduce the deficit-GDP ratio during the next few years. However, a structural misalignment in projected long term expenditures and receipts is evident from Panel-A of Figure 1. Continuing population aging combined with current laws on taxes, transfers, and purchases lead to increasing deficit-GDP ratios for many decades after the mid-2020s

Panel-B of the Figure shows that the deficit-expenditure and deficit-revenues shares continue to increase after the mid-2020s. The deficit-expenditure share increases from a (projected) low of 11.7 percent in 2026 to 33.6 percent by 2095. And the deficit-revenue share increases from 13.3 percent in 2027 to 50.5 percent by 2095. Each year's deficit-expenditure and deficit-revenue ratios indicate the annual percentage changes in each (expenditure cuts or revenue increases) that would be needed to maintain budget balance for each year relative to their projected trajectories under current laws and purchases policy. Increases in both ratios imply that U.S. treasury debt would increase over time. Under PWBM's fiscal projections, debt held by the public would increase as a share of GDP from 97.3 percent in 2021 to 236 percent by 2050 and 839 percent by $2095 .{ }^{16}$

Panel-A of Figure 1 shows slower growth of the expenditure-to-GDP and receipts-to-GDP ratios during the latter part of the 75 -year horizon. This causes the deficit-to-GDP ratio (also shown in Panel A of Figure 1) to also stabilize after the 2070s. The assumed abatement and eventual elimination of excess health care cost growth is the reason for this result. Although the deficit-to-GDP ratio stabilizes, it remains large and positive for a long time after 2095, causing the infinite horizon FI measure to exceed the 75 -year measure.

Because projection uncertainty increases over time, the infinite horizon FI estimate is more uncertain than FI calculated over a finite time horizon. However, larger uncertainty of longer-horizon FI estimates does not necessarily imply that those estimates, which are also anchored upon the continuation of current laws and policies, should be ignored. They provide useful information about the sustainability of current laws and of policy adjustments that target achieving budget balance over a limited time horizon. ${ }^{17}$

[^7]("no-sunset" of expiring provisions).

|  | Assets(+)/ Debt(-) (A) | 75-year Projections |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Assets(+)/ } \\ \text { Debt(-) } \\ \text { (A) } \end{gathered}$ | Infinite Horizon Projections |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Receipts <br> (R) | Expenditures (E) | $\begin{array}{\|c} \hline \text { FI (E- } \\ \text { R-A) } \end{array}$ |  | Receipts <br> (R) | Expenditures (E) | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { FI (E- } \\ \text { R-A) } \end{gathered}$ |
|  | Present values in trillions of constant 2021 dollars* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| U.S. Treasury | $-27.5 * * *$ |  |  | 27.5 | $-27.5 * * *$ |  |  | 27.5 |
| OASDHI | 3.0** | 86.9 | 126.2 | 36.3 | 3.0** | 159.8 | 269.4 | 106.6 |
| non-OASDHI | 3.1** | 146.1 | 128.9 | -20.2 | 3.1** | 270.1 | 272.3 | 0.9 |
| Public Purchases |  | 1.8 | 79.3 | 77.5 |  | 3.4 | 146.6 | 143.2 |
| Net Value | -21.4 | 234.8 | 334.5 | 121.1 | -21.4 | 433.3 | 688.4 | 276.4 |
| Memo: OASDI | 2.9 | 63.2 | 87.9 | 21.8 | 2.9 | 116.7 | 183.4 | 63.8 |
|  | As a percent of PVGDP* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| U.S. Treasury | -2.1 *** |  |  | 2.1 | -1.2 *** |  |  | 1.1 |
| OASDHI | 0.2** | 6.7 | 9.7 | 2.8 | 0.1** | 6.6 | 11.2 | 4.4 |
| non-OASDHI | 0.2** | 11.2 | 9.9 | -1.6 | 0.1** | 11.2 | 11.3 | 0.0 |
| Public Purchases |  | 0.1 | 6.1 | 6.0 |  | 0.1 | 6.1 | 5.9 |
| Net Value/PVGDP | -1.7 | 18.1 | 25.7 | 9.3 | -0.9 | 18.0 | 28.6 | 11.5 |
| Memo: OASDI | 0.2** | 4.9 | 6.8 | 1.7 | 0.1** | 4.8 | 7.6 | 2.6 |
| Memo: PVGDP | 1300.3 |  |  |  | 2410.0 |  |  |  |

Table 2: 75-Year and infinite horizon FI measures under continuation of fiscal laws and purchases policies applicable in 2021 ("no-sunset" of expiring provisions).
Source: Authors’ calculations.

* Present values calculated at a discount rate of 4.4 percent
** Intragovernmental debt for Social Security, Medicare, and other programs
*** Gross federal debt.
Table 2 shows FI under the alternative assumption that fiscal laws and purchases policy
applicable in 2021 are continued in perpetuity. Under this "no-sunset" alternative, future changes by way of expirations of particular tax policies - mostly those enacted under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 that are built into today's fiscal laws - are left unimplemented. ${ }^{18}$ The non-expiration of expiring TCJA tax provisions would reduce federal revenues relative to those under current fiscal laws. ${ }^{19}$ Under

[^8]the "no-sunset" case, FI through 2095 equals $\$ 121.1$ trillion or 9.3 percent of PVGDP. Under the infinite horizon projection the FI is estimated to be 276.4 trillion, which equals 11.5 percent of the PVGDP.



Figure 2: Projected federal deficits as shares of GDP, federal receipts, and non-interest expenditures under continuation of fiscal laws applicable in 2021 ("no-sunset" of expiring provisions).
Source: Authors' calculations.
Panel-A of Figure 2 shows projected annual federal receipts, non-interest expenditures and deficits as a share of GDP under the "no-sunset" alternative. Under it, annual budget deficits are larger, as are deficit-GDP ratios compared to current-law-and-purchases-policy ("sunset") scenario. The latter projections are shown in gray lines for comparison in Figure 2. Expenditure time series under the "sunset" and "no-sunset" cases overlap as there are no expiring expenditure provisions. All of the deficit increase under the "no-sunset" policy emerges from maintaining the revenue changes enacted under TCJA laws.

Panel-B of Figure 2 shows that "no-sunset" deficit-expenditure and deficit-revenues shares are considerably higher compared to those under current-laws-and-purchases policy. The deficit-toexpenditure share now reaches 38.2 percent of GDP by 2095 (compared to 33.6 percent under current-laws-and-purchases policy). And the deficit-receipts share reaches 61.9 percent by 2095 (compared to 50.5 percent under current laws and purchases policy). The increase in the deficit ratios through time
indicates that, absent policy adjustments, U.S. treasury debt will increase to 273 percent of GDP by 2050 (instead of 236 percent under the current law and purchases policy), and to 976 percent by 2095 (compared to 839 percent under the current law and purchases policy). ${ }^{20}$

Figure 3 splits projected annual deficits (as shares of GDP) under current fiscal laws and purchases policy into three components - those arising from OASDHI and non-OASDHI transfers net of receipts and from discretionary public goods' purchases net of premiums, tolls and other receipts associated with those purchases. In the Figure, time profiles under current-law-and-purchases policy ("sunset" case) are shown in darker lines and those under continuation of fiscal laws applicable in 2021 ("no-sunset" of expiring provisions) are shown as light gray lines in corresponding line styles (unbroken, dashed, dotted etc.).

The non-OASDHI component (dotted lines in Figure 3) contributes a surplus that, under current laws and purchases policy, declines over time from just over 5 percent of GDP during the late-2020s to 2.9 percent in 2050 and to 1.2 percent by 2095. An important reason for the reduction of non-OASDHI surplus is growing health care costs on account of Medicare (excluding Part A) and Medicaid programs. ${ }^{21}$

In contrast, OASDHI's deficit-GDP ratio (short dashed lines Figure 3, which are identical under both the "sunset" and "no-sunset" cases), increases rapidly from just under one percent of GDP during the early 2020s to 2.5 percent by 2050 and to 5.3 percent by 2095. Finally, public goods and services purchases in GDP (also identical under the two cases) decline from recent highs to hold steady at just above 6.0 percent of GDP through 2095. ${ }^{22}$ These projections show that non-OASDHI component's surplus is insufficient to cover the combined deficit emerging from OASDHI and public goods purchases. As a result, the total deficit (unbroken line in Figure) as a share of GDP under current law and purchases policy ("sunset" case) increases from a low of 2.5 percent during the mid-2020s to 10.3 percent by 2095.

[^9]

Figure 3: Deficit components as shares of GDP: OASDHI, non-OASDHI, and public purchases under current laws including scheduled expirations ("sunset") and under continuation of fiscal laws applicable in 2021 ("no sunset" of expiring provisions).
Source: Authors' calculations.

The gray lines of Figure 3 show the evolution of these components under continuation of fiscal laws applicable in 2021 ("no-sunset" case without expiration of certain tax and spending provisions). Here, near-term non-OASDHI surpluses decline faster and switch to a 0.3 percent deficit as a share of GDP by 2095. As a result, the total deficit (unbroken line) as a share of GDP increases from a low of 3.3 percent during the early-2020s to 11.8 percent by 2095 .

Panel-A of Figure 4 shows OASDHI receipts, expenditures, and deficit as a share of GDP under current-law OASDHI benefits and tax projections. Panel-B of the Figure shows the same information for non-OASDHI transfers and receipts. The increase in OASDHI deficit result from a faster growth of benefits relative to the growth of OASDHI receipts. As noted above, a key contributors to the increasing resource gap in OASDHI is the (assumed) continuation of excess growth in Medicare Part A expenditures per capita through year 2060. In contrast, receipts exceed expenditures in the non-OASDHI component but the surplus is projected to decline during the next several decades under current fiscal laws and purchases policy.



Figure 4: Federal receipts, expenditures, and deficits in OASDHI and non-OASDHI programs as shares of GDP under current laws.
Source: Authors' calculations.

## 3. The Generational Imbalance Measure for OASDHI

OASDHI expenditures are funded solely out of dedicated payroll tax revenues and income taxes on Social Security benefits of high income retirees. OASDHI revenues and expenditures can both be allocated to particular cohorts (by birth year, gender, race, and education levels) that pay those taxes and receive Social Security and Medicare benefits. By assigning OASDHI trust funds' assets to net tax payments of past cohorts and adding prospective net tax payments of those currently alive, we can calculate the portion of OASDHI's FI that arises from taxes and transfers of the "closed group" of past and current generations.

|  |  | Present Values in Trillions of Constant 2021 Dollars |  |  |  | As a Percent of PVGDP |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Trust Fund | Receipts | Expenditures | Fiscal imbalance | Trust Fund | Receipts | Expenditures | Fiscal imbalance |
|  |  | Panel-A: Through the Infinite Horizon |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Social Security (OASDI) | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { FI } \\ \text { GI } \\ \text { FI-GI } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.9 \\ & 2.9 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 116.7 \\ 46.6 \\ 70.1 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 183.4 \\ 85.3 \\ 98.1 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 63.9 \\ & 38.8 \\ & 25.1 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.1 \\ & 0.1 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 4.8 \\ & 1.9 \\ & 2.9 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7.6 \\ & 3.5 \\ & 4.1 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.7 \\ & 1.6 \\ & 1.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Medicare Part A <br> (HI) | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { FI } \\ \text { GI } \\ \text { FI-GI } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.1 \\ & 0.1 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 43.1 \\ & 16.8 \\ & 26.2 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 86.0 \\ & 38.3 \\ & 47.7 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 42.8 \\ & 21.5 \\ & 21.3 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.0 \\ & 0.0 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 1.8 \\ & 0.7 \\ & 1.1 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 3.6 \\ & 1.6 \\ & 2.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1.8 \\ & 0.9 \\ & 0.9 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| Social Security and Medicare Part A (OASDHI) | $\begin{gathered} \text { FI } \\ \text { GI } \\ \text { FI-GI } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 3.0 \\ & 3.0 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 159.7 \\ 63.4 \\ 96.3 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 269.4 \\ & 123.6 \\ & 145.8 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 106.6 \\ 60.2 \\ 46.4 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.1 \\ & 0.1 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 6.6 \\ & 2.6 \\ & 4.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 11.2 \\ 5.1 \\ 6.0 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4.4 \\ & 2.5 \\ & 1.9 \end{aligned}$ |
| - Panel-B: Through 2095 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Social Security (OASDI) | $\begin{gathered} \text { FI } \\ \text { GI } \\ \text { FI-GI } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.9 \\ & 2.9 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 63.2 \\ & 23.1 \\ & 40.1 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 87.9 \\ & 56.0 \\ & 31.9 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 21.8 \\ 32.9 \\ -11.1 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.2 \\ & 0.2 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 4.9 \\ & 1.8 \\ & 3.1 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 6.8 \\ & 4.3 \\ & 2.5 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 1.7 \\ 2.5 \\ -0.9 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| Medicare Part A <br> (HI) | $\begin{gathered} \text { FI } \\ \text { GI } \\ \text { FI-GI } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.1 \\ & 0.1 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 23.6 \\ 8.0 \\ 15.6 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 38.3 \\ & 24.3 \\ & 14.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 14.5 \\ & 16.3 \\ & -1.7 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.0 \\ & 0.0 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 1.8 \\ & 0.6 \\ & 1.2 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.9 \\ & 1.9 \\ & 1.1 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 1.1 \\ 1.3 \\ -0.1 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
| Social Security and Medicare Part A (OASDHI) | $\begin{gathered} \text { FI } \\ \text { GI } \\ \text { FI-GI } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 3.0 \\ & 3.0 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 86.8 \\ & 31.1 \\ & 55.7 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 126.2 \\ 80.3 \\ 45.9 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 36.3 \\ 49.2 \\ -12.8 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 0.2 \\ & 0.2 \\ & 0.0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 6.7 \\ & 2.4 \\ & 4.3 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9.7 \\ & 6.2 \\ & 3.5 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \hline 2.8 \\ 3.8 \\ -1.0 \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |

Table 3: OASDHI's FI attributable to past and current generations (GI) and future generations (FI-GI).
Source: Authors' calculations.
We call the closed group's contribution to the overall FI the Generational Imbalance (GI). By construction, the imbalance accruing to future generations (under current OASDHI laws) equals $\mathrm{FI}-\mathrm{GI}$.

Table 3 shows the decomposition of OASDHI's FI into GI and FI-GI, both overall and separately for Social Security (OASDI) and Medicare Part-A (HI).

Panel-A of Table 3 shows that FI for OASDHI as a whole equals $\$ 106.6$ trillion over the infinite horizon - the sum of $\$ 63.9$ trillion on account of Social Security and $\$ 42.8$ trillion on account of Medicare Part A. Past and current generations contribute $\$ 38.8$ trillion on account of Social Security and $\$ 21.5$ trillion on account of Medicare Part A to total FI. These GI amounts represent excess benefits in present value that the closed-group cohort will receive over the present value of their payroll taxes and income taxes on Social Security benefits assuming maintenance of current OASDHI laws and income tax laws on Social Security benefits during their remaining lifetimes. Keeping those laws in place indefinitely implies granting net benefits to future generations as well (FI-GI), to the tune of $\$ 25.1$ trillion on account of Social Security and $\$ 21.3$ trillion on account of Medicare Part A.

OASDHI's net benefits to past, current, and future generations under current laws amount to 4.4 percent of PVGDP through the infinite horizon - 2.7 percent on account of Social Security and 1.8 percent on account of Medicare Part A. Of the total OASDHI imbalance of 4.4 percent of PVGDP, 2.5 percent arises on account of past and current generations and 1.9 percent on account of future ones. PanelB of Table 3 shows that one-third of the total OASDHI imbalance ( $\$ 36.3$ trillion out of $\$ 106.6$ trillion), accrues during the next 75 years. Of this amount, 40 percent ( $\$ 14.5$ trillion) accrues on account of Medicare Part A.

## 4. Generational Accounts by Education, Gender and Race

FI and GI measures are a version of generational accounting (GA), which estimates the direct incidence of lifetime net taxes on various population cohorts distinguished by their attributes. A generational account shows the actuarial present value of prospective net taxes (taxes minus transfers) per person, again under the assumption that current federal fiscal laws will remain unchanged in the future. Previous generational accounting studies separated cohorts by birth year (or age as of the base year, here 2021) and gender. ${ }^{23}$ The GAs reported here identify population subgroups by birth-year, gender, race (white, nonwhite) and highest education attained over the lifetime (less than college, college or more). ${ }^{24}$ The advantage of a more granular decomposition lies in more accurately capturing correlations between lifetime taxes and transfers with average longevity. ${ }^{25}$

FI and FI - GI measures reported above for OASDHI programs are the most parsimonious generational accounting measures as they show how total federal indebtedness on account of those programs is distributed across only two groups: past and current generations and all future generations.

[^10]

Figure 5: Generational accounts: Present values of projected net taxes per capita for current and future generations by birth year, gender, race, and lifetime educational attainment.
Source: Author's calculations.
Negative ages on the X-axis indicate future birth years. For projected future-born cohorts, present values are calculated by actuarially discounting annual net tax payments back to birth year and discounting the result back to 2021 using the nominal productivity discount rate of 3.5 percent per year.

In general, GA metrics are designed to reveal how much each cohort (by birth-year, gender, and other attributes) would contribute under current federal tax and transfer laws during its expected (remaining) lifetime toward funding the government's prospective provision of public goods and services at current rates out of GDP. Each cohort's projected net tax payments (taxes minus transfers) per capita are actuarially discounted back to the cohort's birth year. Actuarial calculations take account of differential mortality rates across demographic groups by race, gender, birth-year and education levels. For future-born generations, age-0 present values are additionally discounted back to the base year (2021 in this study) at the rate of annual productivity growth to account for the fact that they would be alive during future periods when labor productivity levels are higher than for those born earlier. Calculation details for GA metrics are provided in the Appendix.

Figure 5 shows GA profiles for population subgroups distinguished by birth-year, gender, race, and lifetime educational attainment. Negative ages indicate cohorts born after the base year 2021. Table 4 shows the dollar values (in constant 2021 dollars) underlying the charts of Figure 5. A detailed breakdown of each cohort's GA is provided in Appendix (section A9). In general, Figure 5 and Table 4 show that college educated cohorts pay positive amounts of net taxes and the non-college-educated receive transfers, on net, during their prospective lifetimes; that those in the early stages of their working lifetimes pay the highest net taxes in present value, and those in pre-retirement lifecycle stages receive the highest net transfers in present value. The following paragraphs describe GA differences by particular demographic attributes.

## A. College educated white and non-white males

Among the college educated, white and non-white males in early-career stages are slated to pay significant amounts of federal net taxes during their remaining lifetimes. The top left chart of Figure 5 shows that "early-career" white college-educated males (aged 10-30 in 2021) may expect to pay more than $\$ 1$ million (in constant 2021 dollars) over their lifetimes in net taxes. The bottom left Panel of Figure 5 shows that similarly-aged non-white college-educated males would pay about one-half of the net taxes of their white counterparts. The reason for their lower net taxes are lower career labor-force attachments, lower efficiency-adjusted work hours and, therefore, lower earnings than white collegeeducated males (see Tables A9.1 and A9.5 in the Appendix). The working- and tax-paying lifecycle stages of college-educated cohorts' (age 10-30) is current or close in time and their benefit-receipt lifecycle stages - late career and retirements - are in the distant future. As expected, both white collegeand non-college-educated males in their late fifties and older receive benefits on net. Comparing Appendix Tables A9.1 and A9.5, which provide detailed decompositions of GAs into present discounted taxes and transfers shows that college educated white males, although they receive more in Social Security benefits, pay even more income and other taxes during retirement compared to their college educated non-white counterparts.

## B. White college- and non-college-educated males

Working aged white males with less than college education receive relatively small amounts of transfers on net in present value. Appendix Tables A9.1 and A9.3 show that compared to college educated white males, non-college-educated white males pay fewer income, payroll, indirect, estate, and other taxes. Although the latter also receive fewer health care and other transfers (because of shorter lifespans) their GAs are smaller or negative compared to their college-educated white counterparts.

## C. Nonwhite college and non-college educated males

Younger non-college educated non-white males receive considerable transfer benefits whereas their college-educated counterparts pay substantial amounts in net taxes. The contrast is highlighted among newborns in 2021: College educated nonwhites would expect to pay more than $\$ 400,000$ in net taxes whereas the non-college-educated would receive almost $\$ 400,000$ in net transfers during their lifetimes.

## D. College educated white and nonwhite females

White college educated females pay more in net taxes compared to nonwhite college-educated females, mainly because of earnings differences. Both cohorts currently have about the same degree of labor force attachments, and receive comparable amounts in social and health care transfers. But college educated women provide more efficiency-adjusted hours, earn more, and pay more taxes than non-college educated women.
E. White college- and non-college-educated females

Among white females, college education confers, prospectively, higher earnings and positive net tax payments whereas not having a college degree leads to receipt of substantial transfers. The difference is starkest for those aged 20 in year 2021: College education begets a lifetime net tax burden of almost $\$ 400,000$ whereas non college status confers net transfers of more than $\$ 400,000$. Most of the difference emerges from the earnings premium accruing to those with at least a college education.
F. Nonwhite college- and non-college-educated females

Similar to their educated white counterparts, younger college educated nonwhite females enjoy higher earnings and pay more taxes compared to younger non-white females without a college education. The latter, in contrast, receive substantially more in federal transfers. Indeed, whereas college educated nonwhite women aged 20 in 2021 pay almost $\$ 1$ million in taxes and receive about $\$ 700,000$ in transfers, on average. Their non-college-educated counterparts, in contrast, pay just $\$ 300,000$ in taxes but receive well above $\$ 900,000$ in transfers, on average, mostly from Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.

| Birth <br> Year | Age in 2021* | White |  |  |  | Nonwhite |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | College+ |  | No College |  | College+ |  | No College |  |
|  |  | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female |
| 2061 | -40 | 553,958 | 123,040 | -115,093 | -306,322 | 341,885 | 72,198 | -257,371 | -443,991 |
| 2051 | -30 | 696,546 | 142,235 | -95,171 | -309,613 | 385,430 | 80,482 | -255,939 | -465,550 |
| 2041 | -20 | 721,564 | 195,202 | -60,287 | -315,316 | 402,703 | 95,097 | -249,730 | -564,616 |
| 2031 | -10 | 787,592 | 255,910 | -68,330 | -376,674 | 494,565 | 83,550 | -337,624 | -537,297 |
| 2021 | 0 | 926,766 | 289,357 | -47,857 | -431,198 | 447,887 | 89,258 | -398,648 | -600,551 |
| 2011 | 10 | 1,127,559 | 286,015 | 8,021 | -345,547 | 639,524 | 168,274 | -348,618 | -657,898 |
| 2001 | 20 | 1,244,020 | 377,594 | -57,933 | -444,567 | 704,605 | 313,991 | -315,764 | -637,677 |
| 1991 | 30 | 1,111,613 | 253,534 | 17,107 | -480,063 | 720,079 | 135,516 | -470,458 | -564,994 |
| 1981 | 40 | 894,904 | 103,922 | -312,663 | -368,391 | 374,077 | -54,361 | -338,836 | -561,102 |
| 1971 | 50 | 428,203 | -177,068 | -402,570 | -433,947 | -54,787 | -291,563 | -563,276 | -631,038 |
| 1961 | 60 | -61,473 | -454,880 | -423,416 | -612,142 | -323,224 | -551,101 | -430,450 | -674,387 |
| 1951 | 70 | -257,178 | -499,277 | -528,312 | -472,427 | -373,589 | -440,018 | -693,929 | -328,248 |
| 1941 | 80 | -188,691 | -313,136 | -312,778 | -307,053 | -273,758 | -123,898 | -162,917 | -265,301 |
| 1931 | 90 | -270,126 | -351,237 | -103,555 | -93,920 | -311,993 | -328,442 | -464,934 | -190,446 |

Table 4: Generational Accounts: Present values of future net taxes per capita in constant 2021 dollars by birth year, race, gender, and lifetime educational attainment.
Source: Author's calculations.

* Negative ages indicate birth in the future. For projected future born cohorts, present values calculated by actuarially discounting net taxes to birth year and discounting the result back to 2021 using the productivity discount rate of 3.5 percent per year.


## References

Auerbach, Alan, J., Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff (1991). "Generational Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting" The MIT Press.

Biggs, Andrew, and Jagadeesh Gokhale (2007). "Wage Growth and the Measurement of Social Security's Financial Condition," in Government Spending on the Elderly, ed. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, Chapter 11, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Gokhale, Jagadeesh and Kent A Smetters, (2004). "Fiscal and Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures for New Budget Priorities," AEI Press.

Gokhale, Jagadeesh (2008). "Generational Accounting," in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., ed. Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Gokhale, Jagadeesh (2014). "The Government Debt Iceberg" Research Monograph, Institute of Economic Affairs, the United Kingdom.

United States Department of the Treasury (2022). "Financial Report of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2021," Washington D.C.: https://fiscal.treasury.gov/reports-statements/financial-report/

Social Security Board of Trustees (2021). "2021 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Funds," Washington D.C.

Medicare Board of Trustees (2021). "2021 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds," Washington D.C.

Congressional Budget Office (2021). "10-Year Budget Projections" February 2021:
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data\#3
Congressional Budget Office (2021). "10-Year Economic Projections" February 2021:
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data\#3
Congressional Budget Office (2021). "Long-Term Budget Projections" February 2021:
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data\#3

## Appendix

## Calculating Generational Accounts and Fiscal and Generational Imbalance Measures

## A1. Overview

Fiscal imbalance and generational accounting metrics take as their starting point the government's present-valued (intertemporal) budget constraint. This constraint may be written as
(A1.0) $\mathrm{PVG}_{\mathrm{t}}=\mathrm{NWG}+\mathrm{PVTL}_{\mathrm{t}}+\mathrm{PVTF}_{\mathrm{t}}$.
Equation (A1.0) is a financing constraint. It says that at time $t$ (the initial year), the present value of all prospective government purchases of goods and services, $\mathrm{PVG}_{t}$, must be paid for out of its total resources: the net wealth of the government, $\mathrm{NWG}_{t}$ plus the present value of prospective net tax payments by current generations, $\mathrm{PVTL}_{t}$, and plus the present value of aggregate net tax payments by future-born generations, $\mathrm{PVTF}_{t}$. Net taxes are calculated as tax payments net of transfer receipts in each period.

Equation (A1.0) may be satisfied under many different configurations of government tax and spending laws. For example, low (high) $\mathrm{PVG}_{\mathrm{t}}$ implies that prospective net tax payments of living and future generations must be correspondingly lower (higher) for the two sides of (A1.0) to balance; and given $\mathrm{PVG}_{\mathrm{t}}$, low net taxes levied on living generations must be offset by higher net tax levies on future ones, and so on.

In general, prospective government spending and net taxes of living and future generations under current law (denoted as $\mathrm{PVG}_{t}^{c}, \mathrm{PVTL}_{t}^{c}$, and $\mathrm{PVTF}_{t}^{c}$ ), which includes scheduled future changes such as expirations of particular spending, tax, and transfer laws, the two sides of (A1.0) usually would not be equal. The present valued difference between the government's current-law spending and resources equals the current-law fiscal imbalance, $\mathrm{FI}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{c}}$.
$\mathrm{FI}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{c}}=\mathrm{PVG}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{c}}-\left[\mathrm{NWG}_{\mathrm{t}}+\mathrm{PVTL}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{c}}+\mathrm{PVTF}_{\mathrm{t}}^{c}\right]$.
Since resources actually on hand today, $N W G_{t}$, are already accounted for and fixed from past accruals, the present valued dollar amount, $\mathrm{FI}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{c}}$, shows the additional resources needed for the government to fully fund current-law purchases, $\mathrm{PVG}_{t}^{c}$. A positive value of $\mathrm{FI}_{\mathrm{t}}^{\mathrm{c}}$ indicates a funding shortfall that must
be resolved either by levying additional net taxes (increasing taxes or cutting transfers from current-law levels) or by reducing government purchases themselves below current-law levels. That is eliminating the imbalance shown in (A1.1) involves changing fiscal laws to establish equality of the two sides of equation (A1.0).

## A2. Computation Method

Estimation of the two present-valued terms within square brackets in equation (A1.1) can be accomplished by calculating generational accounts. A "generational account" (GA) is the dollar amount, defined as the actuarially discounted present value of per capita net tax payments (under a given fiscal policy) of a population cohort over the rest of its expected lifetime. ${ }^{26}$ Adding up the population-weighted GAs of all birth cohorts alive today yields the term $\operatorname{PVTL}_{t}^{c}$. Similarly, calculating the GAs of yet-to-beborn population cohorts over their expected lifetimes (by using future population projections) and adding their population-weighted present-discounted values yields the term $\mathrm{PVTF}_{t}^{c}{ }^{27}$ Generational accounts and fiscal imbalance measures can be calculated under any given set of fiscal laws or policies, $p$, to reveal the extent of tax- and spending-law adjustments needed to restore intertemporal budget balance $\left(\mathrm{FI}_{\mathrm{t}}^{p}=0\right)$. It also reveals the extent of trade-offs in distributing the adjustments on spending and net taxes on living and future generations.

The term NWG ${ }_{t}$ is simply total contractual asset/debt position of the government vis-à-vis the rest of the world. ${ }^{28}$ As noted above, the sum of generational accounts over all members of living generations yields the term $\operatorname{PVTL}_{t}^{c}$. This sum is
(A2.2) $\mathrm{PVTL}_{t}^{c}=\sum_{j_{t}=0}^{D} \sum_{x}\left(G A_{j_{t}, t}^{c, x} p_{j_{t}, t}^{x}\right)$,

[^11]where, $x$ represents a combination of gender, education, and race attributes [gender (male, female), education (college degree, no-college degree) and race (white, non-white)], D is the maximum age of life (assumed to be 120 years), $p_{j_{t}, t}^{x}$ represent the populations of type $x$ aged $j$ in year $t$, and $G A_{j_{t}, t}^{c, x}$ represents current-law generational account in year $t$ of person-types $x$ aged $j$ in year $t$ (indexed by $j_{t}$ ) - that is, the present values as of year $t$ of the per capita net taxes that each generation would pay under current law during its expected lifetime.

The generational account, $G A_{j_{t}, t}^{c, x}$ is calculated as
(A2.3) $G A_{j_{t}, t}^{c, x}=\frac{1}{p_{j_{t}, t}^{x}} \sum_{s=t}^{t+D-j_{t}} \sum_{x} p_{j_{t}, s}^{x}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{k} q_{i, j, s}^{c, x}\right) R^{s-t}$,
where $R=1 /(1+r)$, and $r$ is the discount rate. Equation (A2.3) expresses the actuarially discounted value of prospective per capita net payments of a generation aged $j$ at year $t$. The account for each generation is calculated by (1) finding the algebraic sum of the per capita taxes and transfers paid in each year, $s$, by the members surviving in that year (including people of that age and person-type who have immigrated since year $t$ ), (2) multiplying that sum by the population in year $s$, (3) discounting the result back to year $t$, (4) aggregating such discounted values over the generation's lifetime, and (5) dividing the result by the generation's population in the initial year, $t$. In equation (A2.3), $q_{i, j_{t}, s}^{c, x}$ stands for the currentlaw per capita payment (or receipt, when $q$ is negative) of type $i$ in year $s(>t)$ by a generation of person-type $x$ aged $j$ in year $t$. The per capita net payment-after accounting for all $(k)$ types of taxes and transfers in year $s$-is given by the sum in parentheses in (A2.3). This term, multiplied by the population of such persons in year $s, p_{j_{t}, s}^{x}$ yields the aggregate net payment that individuals of type $x$ aged $j$ in year $t$ make in year $s$. U.S. population projections are taken from PWBM's microsimulation, which is calibrated to many features of the United States demography and demographic projections. Summing such discounted values for each year $s$ over the remaining life of individuals aged $j$ in year $t$ (from $t$ to $+D-j_{t}$ ) yields the discounted value of their aggregate net tax payments. Division by $p_{j_{t}, t}^{x}$, the population of such persons in year $t$, converts this actuarially discounted sum to a per capita amount and
represents the generational account of the generation of person-type $x$, aged $j$ in year $t$, under current fiscal laws (denoted by superscript $c$ ).

Prospective per capita payments of each type of tax (or transfer) are estimated by distributing projected aggregate payments of that type by age and person-type categories. In making the distribution, generational accounting begins with projections of the U.S. population and of aggregate federal taxes and transfers. To each type of aggregate tax or transfer projection, it applies a relative profile by age and person-type normalized to a 40-year-old male. The exception is child-SCHIP benefits that are allocated only to children aged 0-17 with relative profiles normalized to male children aged $12 .{ }^{29}$ The relative profile value for a 38 -year-old woman is the ratio of her per capita payment to that of a 40 -year-old man.

Relative profiles for various taxes and transfers are estimated from survey data and the latest available profiles are used to distribute projected aggregate payments by age and person-type in future years. For the United States, these estimates are taken from the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (Annual Social and Economic Survey), the Social Security Administration's Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, the Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances and the Census Bureau's Survey of Consumer Expenditures.

The Congressional Budget Office's projections of aggregate payments are available only through the year 2030. For years 2021-2030, the relative tax/transfer profiles are used to distribute by age and person-type, projected aggregate federal revenues and transfer expenditures. This yields per capita payments by age and person-type for those years. Per capita values for later years are obtained by growing per capita values for the last available year (2030) at the rate of labor productivity ( $g$ ). Hence, if the last available tax and expenditure aggregate if for year $l$,
(A2.4) $q_{i, j_{t}, l+u}^{c, x}=q_{i, j_{t}, l}^{c, x} *(1+g)^{u}, \quad i=1, . . k ; \quad u=1, \ldots T$.
Relative tax and transfer profiles and associated aggregate payments and receipts specify the pattern of prospective per capita taxes levied on and receipts provided to various generations living at

[^12]year $t$ and, therefore, collectively embody the generational pattern of fiscal policy at year $t$. Because all relative profiles are normalized to average payments by z-year-old males (40-year-old males in general and 12-year-old male children in the case of SCHIP benefits), the per capita payment of the z-aged normalizing individuals can be expressed as
(A2.5) $q_{i, i, t}^{c, m}=\frac{Q_{i, t}^{c}}{\sum_{j_{t}=0}^{D}\left(r_{i, j, t}^{m} t_{j, t}^{m} p_{j, t, t}^{f}+r_{i, t}^{f} t_{j, t}^{f}\right)}$.
In (A2.5), $r_{i, j_{t}, t}^{m}$ represents the per capita payment (or receipt, if negative) of type $i$ that a person aged $j$ in year $t$ makes relative to the payment of a 40-year-old male in year $t$, and $Q_{i, t}^{c}, \mathrm{t}$ represents the aggregate current-law payment or receipt of type $i$ made in year $t$. Of course,
(A2.6) $q_{i, j_{t}, t}^{c, x}=q_{i, z, t}^{c, m} \cdot r_{i, j_{t}, t}^{x}$.
$P V G_{t}$ is estimated by discounting prospective aggregate government purchases back to year $t$. If projections of aggregate purchases are unavailable or need to be extended, they are estimated by distributing, according to age, the per capita purchases in the last year (actual or projected) for which an aggregate figure is available, by making the per capita purchases by age grow at the same rate as labor productivity, and finally, by using a population projection to aggregate the per capita figures. Many yearly government purchases, such as for defense and general administration, cannot be assigned to specific age groups and are prorated to all individuals alive in that year. Note that generational accounting methodology uses estimates of government purchases by age only to mechanically extend the projections of those purchases. It does not try to assign the benefits of such purchases by age and person-type. As with the per capita distribution of taxes and transfers, the estimates for purchases assume a constant relative profile by age-a set of empirically determined ratios that represent an element of the current generational stance of fiscal policy.

Government net wealth, $N W G_{t}$, can be estimated by cumulating the sum of past government surpluses (or deficits, if negative). The government's existing tangible assets, such as parks and infrastructure, are excluded from $N W G_{t}$, and their prospective service flows, which represent the consumption of public goods, are excluded from $\mathrm{PVG}_{t}^{c}$. If these assets were included in $N W G_{t}$, their
service flows would have to be included in $\mathrm{PVG}_{t}^{c}$. Because the value of the assets must, by definition, equal the present value of their service flows, they would cancel each other if they were included in equation (A1.1). Thus, the exclusion of these items does not affect the trade-off between $\mathrm{PVTL}_{t}^{c}$ and $\mathrm{PVTF}_{t}^{c}$.

## A3. Generational Imbalance (GI)

Programs such as Social Security and Medicare Part 1 (Hospital Insurance) are purely redistributive in that all dedicated payroll and other taxes are eventually paid out as benefits. ${ }^{30}$ The social insurance these programs provide occasions an on-going redistribution from workers to retirees and other beneficiaries. Generational accounting estimates and incorporates the dollars paid and received by various birth-cohorts. ${ }^{31}$

The fiscal imbalance for such programs can be written as the negative of existing assets in the program's trust fund $\left(N W T F_{t}\right)$ and the sum of the actuarially discounted present values of net payroll and other taxes projected for living and future generations: negative lifetime net tax payments (taxes-benefits $<0$ in present value over remaining lifetime) increase the program's fiscal imbalance.
(A3.1) $\quad \mathrm{FI}_{t}^{c}=-\left(\mathrm{NWTF}_{t}+\mathrm{PVTL}_{t}^{c}+\mathrm{PVTF}_{t}^{c}\right)$.
Calculations of the terms $\mathrm{PVTL}_{t}^{c}$ and $\mathrm{PVTL}_{t}^{c}$ are restricted to program revenues and expenditures and follow the same steps as described above. In the case of programs with dedicated revenue sources, the term $-\left(\mathrm{NWTF}_{t}+\mathrm{PVTL}_{t}^{c}\right)$ on the right hand-side of (A3.1) shows the Generational Imbalance $\left(G I_{t}^{c}\right)$ on account of past and living generations. ${ }^{32}$

A positive $\mathrm{FI}_{t}^{c}$ indicates a shortfall of resources that must eventually be made up through a change in current tax and benefit laws. Given $\operatorname{NWTF}_{t}$, which is fixed from the past, the change in GI $_{t}^{c}$ following a change in the laws indicates how much of the policy adjustment is levied on living generations. For

[^13]example, a change in laws that results in a large reduction in $\mathrm{FI}_{t}^{c}$ but little change in $G I_{t}^{c}$ would show that most of the adjustment cost is levied on future generations of program participants under the new laws.

## A4. PWBM's Estimation of FI, GI and GAs.

Generations are distinguished by single-year of birth, age, gender, race (white and non-white) and educational attainment (college degree and no college degree). Relative tax and transfer profiles are calculated from micro-data surveys, one for each combination of these attributes. That is, for each age, we distinguish 12 person-types as shown in Table A4.1. Earlier generational accounting calculations distinguished generations by age and gender only. That's because demographic projections of the Social Security Administration that are used in those studies do not decompose population projections by race and education. The PWBM microsimulation, which is calibrated to demographic and economic features of the United States, projects race and education (among other) attributes of the projected population.

| Name | Gender (M) | Education (C1, C2) | Race (W, NW) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| MC1W | Male | Less than college degree | White |
| MC2W | Male | College degree or more | White |
| FC1W | Female | Less than college degree | White |
| FC2W | Female | College degree or more | White |
| MC1N | Male | Less than college degree | Nonwhite |
| MC2N | Male | College degree or more | Nonwhite |
| FC1N | Female | Less than college degree | Nonwhite |
| FC2N | Female | College degree or more | Nonwhite |

Table A4.1. Person-Type Characteristics Distinguished for Calculating Labor Efficiency
Because mortality, fertility, and immigration rates (and their evolution through many interactive socio-economic processes such as ages and frequencies of marriage, childbearing, and divorce, patterns of assortative mating, and processes of family formation and dissolution etc.) differ significantly across individuals by race and education, the demographic composition of the future population is projected to change according to trends in those variables observed in the past. The PWBM microsimulation builds in those trends to deliver an evolving future demographic profile.

Differential base-period tax and transfer distributions by race and education in addition to age and gender, interact with differential sub-population growth and mortality rates. Table A. 1 shows the classification of sub-populations by gender, race, and education (maximum attainment over the lifetime). Fiscal Imbalance and generational account calculations made under a more granular demographic decomposition yield estimates that account for the correlation between benefit receipts, tax payments, and survival rates. It turns out that within each gender, sub-populations that predominantly receive benefits, on net, during their lifetimes (nonwhite and the less educated) are also those with higher mortality rates. And subpopulations that earn more, retire later, and pay taxes, on net, during their lifetimes (white and with more education) experience greater longevity. Distinguishing age profiles of relative taxes and benefits by gender alone would miss this correlation between the size of lifetime net taxes and longevity.

Figure A4.2 shows relative tax and benefit profiles by age estimated from micro-data surveys and used to allocate federal taxes and benefits for 37 tax and benefit programs in the federal budget items. ${ }^{33}$ Several age-benefits profile charts in the figure, especially those related to means tested benefits such as Medicaid (3), Supplementary Nutritional Assistance (5), Supplemental Security Income (6), Unemployment Compensation (7) Earned Income Credit (8) and other welfare transfers (10), rental subsidies (25), child nutrition (26), disability insurance (27), pandemic relief (28), indicate higher benefit awards per capita to nonwhites (orange and blue lines) and those with lowest education (dotted lines). On the other hand, the age-profiles for taxes such as labor income taxes (21), Social Security payroll taxes (22), Medicare payroll taxes (23), capital income taxes (32), real-estate taxes (34), corporate income taxes (35), deposit insurance premiums (36), indirect taxes (39), etc. show higher relative values for whites (red and green lines) and those with high-education (unbroken lines). Moreover, the profile for labor force attachment (24) shows lower levels for nonwhite and less educated individuals.

[^14]
























Figure A4.2: Relative tax and transfer profiles by single year of age.
Sources: Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey - 2020; Survey or Consumer Finances from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors 2019; Consumer Expenditure Survey from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics - 2019
Legend labels: M=Male, F=Female, C=College Degree, N=No College Degree, W=White, B=Non-White.

## A5. Projecting U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

## A. Production Function Framework

PWBM's projection of U.S. GDP utilizes a production function framework that specified how inputs of labor and capital are convert to output each year. The production function for each year $t$, is given by equation (A5.1)
(A5.1) $Y_{t}=P_{t} A_{t} K_{t}^{\alpha} L_{t}{ }^{1-\alpha}$
$Y_{t}=$ Nominal national output
$P_{t}=$ Price level
$A_{t}=$ Multifactor productivity
$K_{t}=$ Capital services input
$L_{t}=$ Efficiency adjusted labor services input
$\alpha=$ Output elasticity of capital
Decompose $L_{t}=h_{t} \times H_{t}$
$H_{t}=$ total hours (FTEH) and $h_{t}$ is average worker efficiency per FTEH to get
(A5.2) $Y_{t}=P_{t} A_{t} K_{t}^{\alpha}\left(h_{t} H_{t}\right)^{1-\alpha}$
Total labor productivity, $\eta_{t}$, which is output per hour, is given by
(A5.3) $\eta_{t}=\frac{Y_{t}}{H_{t}}=A_{t} K_{t}^{\alpha} h_{t}^{1-\alpha} H_{t}{ }^{-\alpha}=A_{t} k_{t}^{\alpha} h_{t}^{1-\alpha}$, where $k_{t}=K_{t} / H_{t}$.
Expressed in terms of growth rates:
(A5.4) $\frac{d \eta_{t}}{\eta_{t}}=g^{\eta}=\frac{d A_{t}}{A_{t}}+\alpha \frac{d k_{t}}{k_{t}}+(1-\alpha) \frac{d h_{t}}{h_{t}}=g^{A}+\alpha g^{k}+(1-\alpha) g^{n}$,
Equation (A5.4) shows the components of labor productivity growth. Of these, multifactor productivity growth $d A_{-} t / A_{-} t$, is measured as the excess growth in GDP from technological improvements after accounting for growth of labor and capital inputs. This growth component is assumed
to continue at its historical rate of 0.63 percent per year. ${ }^{34}$ The output elasticity of capital is also estimated from BLS productivity data and set at 0.367 .

## B. Production Factor Inputs:

Labor productivity growth from higher capital intensity, $k_{t}$, is measured by the growth of the productive capital stock relative to labor hours. Productive capital equals non-residential fixed assets (equipment, structures, and intellectual property products) plus non-owner-occupied and other residential structures owned by households, corporates, sole-proprietorships and partnerships, and non-profit institutions. The total for 2020 is $\$ 40.6$ trillion.

Capital Stock projections are made by distributing the initial year's (2021) capital stock (\$40.6 trillion) among holders of claims on the nation's capital. The distributions of holdings by the 12 persontypes are calculated by using the Federal Reserve's 2019 Survey of Consumer Finances. This survey identifies the distribution of asset holdings. Liquid assets, which represent transactions balances (cash and money market accounts and other liquid assets) are excluded and remaining assets are distributed across the 12 person types noted earlier. Figure A5.1 shows these distributions.


Figure A5.1: Relative Age Profiles of Fixed Capital Ownership by Person Type. Source: The Survey of Consumer Finances.

[^15]Projection of the productive capital stock for future years assumes that relative holding patterns of claims on that stock will remain constant and changes in population's size and in the relative proportions of person-types in the population will drive the evolution of the stock. Projecting aggregate productive capital in this manner yields an average annual growth rate of 1.3 percent per year through the year 2100. In the very long term, that growth rate averages to just over 1 percent per year.

Efficient labor, L, growth is calculated by first finding relative average hourly wages in the base year (2021) by person-type from the PWBM Microsim's annual wage and work hours variables. These relative average hourly wages are considered to be the efficiency rates of the different person types. Table A5.1 provides the relative ratios, normalized to the average hourly wage of a non-white female with less than high-school education (FC1N).

| Person Type | MC1W | MC2W | FC1W | FC2W | MC1N | MC2N | FC1N | FC2N |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average Wage: \$ Per Hour | 26.41 | 67.90 | 19.83 | 42.35 | 21.00 | 51.47 | 17.05 | 35.70 |
| Relative Labor Efficiency Index <br> FC1N=1 | 1.549 | 3.982 | 1.163 | 2.483 | 1.232 | 3.018 | 1.000 | 2.093 |

Table A5.1: Index of Relative Work-Efficiency per Hour by Person type in 2021: FC1N=1.0.
Person type Legend: Gender: $\mathrm{M}=\mathrm{Male} \mathrm{F}=$ Female; Education: $\mathrm{C} 1=$ Less than College, $\mathrm{C} 2=$ College or More; Race: W=White, $\mathrm{N}=$ Nonwhite.

Growth in total hours through the year 2100 is projected by the Microsim to be almost zero - a consequence of growth in the relative proportion of worker-types with low attachment to the labor force, population aging and a shift in the age distribution of workers toward older (pre-retirement) ages, and a general trend toward reduced hours by all groups of workers. The countervailing factor is an increase in the share of better educated workers in the overall work force. Figure A5.2 show projected changes in the U.S. total and worker populations (right axis) by person-type and changes in their total hours and efficiency-adjusted hours worked (left axis).



Figure A5.2: Projected total population (P), worker population (W), average hours per worker (H), and average efficiency-adjusted hours per worker (L) by person type through 2095.
Source: Author's calculations from the PWBM Microsim.
Title legend: Person types: Gender: $\mathrm{M}=\mathrm{Male} \mathrm{F}=$ Female; Education: $\mathrm{C} 1=$ Less than College, C2=College or More; Race: W=White, N=Nonwhite.

As is evident from Figure A5.2, total and worker populations (red lines) of whites of both genders with less than college education levels is projected to decline and the populations of whites with college or more education are projected to remain stable. The latter have greater labor force attachment as seen in the hours/worker and efficiency-hours per worker profiles (blue lines). Projected shifts in total and worker populations result from lower projected fertility and immigration and also higher education attainment over time for whites. In contrast, populations of both college and less than college educated nonwhites are projected to increase over time from
higher fertility and immigration rates. Among non-whites, each gender-education group has lower hours and efficiency-adjusted hours relative to their white counterparts. ${ }^{35}$

## A6 Projecting production function parameters and U.S. GDP from PWBM's Microsimulation.

The PWBM Microsim's output includes the "class of worker" variable, which distinguishes between private sector, federal, and state and local workers. Since the Microsim reports nominal wages for all workers and not total compensation, the latter is estimated by estimating the benefits component of employee compensation from historical data. A power regression of the ratio of total benefits to total wages using U.S. national income and product accounts data (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 2.1) is implemented to extrapolate the benefits/wages ratio for future years. ${ }^{36}$ The benefits/wages ratio stood at 21.8 percent in 2021. Extrapolating the share using estimated power regression coefficients has the ratio increasing to 23.2 percent by 2050 and to 24.5 percent by 2095 . These projected benefits/wages ratios are applied to microsim private and government sector total wages to obtain projected future private and government sector total compensation series.

The private sector contribution to GDP is calculated via equation (3). Government sector's GDP contribution is assumed to equal the sum of government employee compensation plus government capital depreciation. The latter is projected in two steps: First, government capital depreciation is estimated using a time-trend power regression on the depreciation rate

[^16]using historical data on the ratio of government capital depreciation to government capital stock. ${ }^{37}$ Next a power regression is estimated on the historical ratio of the government capital stock to total government employee compensation. ${ }^{38}$ Both ratios are historically quite stable and the power regressions point to stable long-term values for both. The depreciation rate is estimated to decrease very slightly from 3.9 percent in 2020 to 3.8 percent by 2050 and to 3.7 percent by 2095. The ratio of the government capital stock to government employee compensation is projected to increase slightly from 1.28 percent in 2020 to 1.29 percent by 2050 and to remain at that value thereafter.

The product of projected government compensation and the capital-compensation ratio yields the projected stock of government capital. And the product of the capital depreciation rate with the government capital stock yields projected government depreciation. Finally, total U.S. GDP is projected as the sum of private sector and government contributions to GDP.

Figure A6.1 depicts projected U.S. nominal GDP through the year 2095. To calculate FI in perpetuity, The PWBM simulation was implemented through the year 2500 - long enough to allow present discounted values of out-year deficits to not influence the present valued FI measure. The simulation through year 2500 also enables the calculation of GDP in perpetuity. ${ }^{39}$

[^17]

Figure A6.1: Projected nominal GDP and nominal labor productivity growth. Source: Author's Calculations from the PWBM microsimulation.

Finally, nominal projected GDP values are discounted using the interest discount factor of 4.4 percent per year. Table A6.1 below reports PVGDP, estimated as described above (in trillions of constant 2021 dollars) over two alternative time horizons: 2020-95 and 2020-2500.

| Present discounted value of projected U.S. GDP in trillions of constant 2021 dollars |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Microsim (15K households in <br> 2015 Scaled to the U.S. | Through 2095 | Through the infinite <br> horizon |
| household population in 2015) | $1,300.3$ | $2,410.0$ |

Table A6.1: Present Value of Projected GDP under Current Fiscal Laws.

## A7. Adjusting Generational Accounts for the Incidence of Taxes on Owners of Capital

Tax policy changes introduced by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 imply changes to the incidence of capital income taxes across generations. That law reduced the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21 percent and introduced investment incentives by way of expensing of equipment and software, amortization of research expenditures, expansion of bonus depreciation, and other provisions that alter the timing of capital income accruals relative to tax payments. In addition, future taxes may be capitalized into asset values and changes in tax rates and expensing provisions for new investments may shift tax burdens away from (or toward) future capital owners - who pay the taxes - and toward (or away from) current holders of capital who bear capital losses (or enjoy capital gains). For example, prior scheduled depreciation deductions no longer apply under TCJA's accelerated depreciation schedule as implied by full expensing provisions: Under pre-TCJA law many capital investments that would have been depreciated gradually over the following decade are taken at once, producing lower effective tax rates immediately. On the other hand, expensing provisions for new investments would induce tax arbitrage to reduce the value of older capital assets, imposing losses on current capital owners. Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) describe the adjustments needed to GAs in order to correctly allocate capital taxes to generations that bear them rather than those who pay them. The adjustments needed depend upon the particular configurations of capital taxation provisions, applicable parameters on investment growth, depreciation rates, after-tax interest rates and other factors. The adjustments require estimates of two rates, $Q$ and $\Delta$, the former indicating the amount of additional tax burdens on current owners of capital from capital asset revaluations,
and the latter showing the percentage reduction in projected capital income taxes paid by future capital owners. ${ }^{40}$ The formulae for the two adjustment factors are:
(A1) $Q=\tau Z\left(1-\frac{n+\delta}{n+\tau+\varphi}\right)$
(A2) $\quad \Delta=(r+\delta) \tau Z\left[1-\frac{(r+\pi+\varphi)(n+\delta)}{(n+\pi+\varphi)(r+\delta)}\right]$.
Table below provides the legend and rates of the parameters used to calculate Q and $\Delta$ :

| Parameter | Description | Value |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| $r$ | Post-tax rate of return | $2.3 \%$ |
| $\delta$ | Economic depreciation rate | $8.0 \%$ |
| $\pi$ | Inflation rate | $2.0 \%$ |
| $\tau$ | Investor marginal tax rate | $21.0 \%$ |
| $n$ | Growth rate of investment | 1.1 |
| $z$ | Present value of depreciation allowances $\delta /(r+\delta)$ | 0.65 |
| $\varphi$ | Geometric rate of investment write-off $(r+\pi) z /$ <br> $(1-z)$ | 0.12 |

These parameters generate a value of $\mathrm{Q}=0.08$ and $\Delta=.001$. Hence, GAs reported in the text are calculated by distributing a capital loss of 8 percent on current owners of capital (those alive in 2021) and a reduction in future flows of capital income taxes by 0.001 percent. ${ }^{41}$

[^18]
## A8. Receipts and Expenditures Distributed Across Population Cohorts by Birth Year, Gender, Race, and Lifetime Education

| Year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Individual Labor Income Taxes | 1051 | 1259 | 1283 | 1314 | 1366 | 1513 | 1644 | 1691 | 1748 | 1806 |
| Individual Capital Income Taxes (adjusted) | 556 | 667 | 679 | 695 | 723 | 801 | 871 | 895 | 925 | 956 |
| One time Capital Levy | 2717 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| OASDI Payroll Taxes (see NIPA sheet) | 931 | 920 | 999 | 1034 | 1064 | 1100 | 1129 | 1163 | 1199 | 1238 |
| Medicare Part A (see NIPA sheet) | 334 | 373 | 389 | 407 | 426 | 449 | 472 | 492 | 512 | 532 |
| Total Income taxes on SS benefits | 59 | 75 | 82 | 89 | 97 | 118 | 132 | 143 | 155 | 167 |
| Other SocIns Taxes (UI; see NIPA sheet) | 60 | 59 | 64 | 66 | 68 | 71 | 72 | 75 | 77 | 79 |
| Corporate Income Taxes (CBO 02/2021) | 164 | 252 | 304 | 328 | 355 | 365 | 361 | 369 | 377 | 385 |
| Excise taxes | 79 | 86 | 86 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 91 | 91 | 92 | 93 |
| Estate and gift taxes | 22 | 24 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 28 | 40 | 43 | 45 | 47 |
| Federal Reserve | 103 | 118 | 127 | 134 | 119 | 102 | 97 | 88 | 78 | 73 |
| Customs duties | 82 | 89 | 90 | 92 | 95 | 97 | 99 | 100 | 101 | 102 |

Table A8.1: Federal Receipts (CBO February 2021 Budget and Economic Outlook)

| Year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Old Age and Survivors Insurance | 991 | 1,047 | 1,108 | 1,175 | 1,245 | 1,319 | 1,396 | 1,484 | 1,573 | 1,664 |
| Disability Insurance | 145 | 152 | 161 | 170 | 177 | 185 | 192 | 195 | 201 | 207 |
| Hospital Insurance (Medicare A) | 337 | 382 | 405 | 412 | 456 | 483 | 514 | 574 | 552 | 610 |
| Supplementary Medical Insurance (Medicare B) | 397 | 450 | 492 | 512 | 580 | 628 | 679 | 770 | 756 | 847 |
| Prescription Drugs (Medicare D) | 97 | 110 | 120 | 124 | 136 | 145 | 155 | 173 | 167 | 185 |
| Medicaid | 507 | 514 | 492 | 504 | 533 | 563 | 597 | 632 | 667 | 705 |
| Health Insurance Premium tax credits | 56 | 55 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 53 | 55 | 59 | 64 | 68 |
| Medicare-eligible Retiree HC Fund (MERHCF) | 11 | 12 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 17 |
| Children's' Health Insurance (CHIP) | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 19 |
| Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | 132 | 99 | 78 | 76 | 75 | 75 | 74 | 74 | 73 | 72 |
| Supplemental Security Income | 57 | 64 | 61 | 59 | 66 | 68 | 70 | 78 | 68 | 77 |
| Unemployment Compensation | 242 | 40 | 37 | 36 | 34 | 33 | 34 | 36 | 38 | 41 |
| Earned Income, Child, and Other Tax Credits | 268 | 90 | 92 | 93 | 93 | 92 | 78 | 78 | 79 | 79 |
| Family Support and Foster Care | 34 | 34 | 33 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 35 |
| Child Nutrition | 23 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 37 |
| Civilian Retirement | 110 | 114 | 117 | 120 | 124 | 127 | 131 | 135 | 138 | 142 |
| Military Retirement | 63 | 71 | 68 | 64 | 72 | 74 | 76 | 84 | 75 | 84 |
| Other Retirement | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | -2 | 8 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| Veterans Income Security | 119 | 134 | 129 | 122 | 137 | 142 | 147 | 164 | 144 | 162 |
| Veterans Other Benefits | 17 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 19 | 21 |
| Agriculture | 40 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac | 0 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Higher Education | 7 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| Deposit Insurance | -3 | -1 | -4 | -4 | -4 | -5 | -6 | -7 | -8 | -8 |
| Small Business Administration | 303 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Coronavirus Relief Fund | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Emergency Rental assistance | 24 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Medicare SMI Premiums (offsetting receipts) | -142 | -160 | -173 | -186 | -204 | -219 | -238 | -257 | -269 | -289 |
| Other Spending | 89 | 76 | 77 | 75 | 72 | 71 | 72 | 75 | 75 | 73 |
| Federal Share Social Security | -20 | -21 | -22 | -23 | -24 | -25 | -26 | -27 | -28 | -29 |
| Federal Share Civil Service Retirement and Other | -46 | -48 | -49 | -50 | -52 | -53 | -55 | -57 | -59 | -61 |
| Federal Share Military Retirement | -25 | -26 | -26 | -27 | -27 | -28 | -28 | -29 | -29 | -30 |
| Receipts Related to Natural Resources | -10 | -10 | -10 | -11 | -11 | -11 | -11 | -12 | -12 | -13 |
| Receipts Related to MERHCF | -9 | -10 | -10 | -11 | -11 | -12 | -12 | -13 | -13 | -14 |
| Receipts Related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac | -5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Receipts Related to Other | -35 | -109 | -38 | -30 | -40 | -31 | -30 | -28 | -28 | -28 |
| Discretionary Expenditures (Public Goods) | 1,668 | 1,610 | 1,593 | 1,590 | 1,620 | 1,654 | 1,694 | 1,734 | 1,778 | 1,822 |

Table A8.2: Federal Expenditures (CBO February 2021 Budget and Economic Outlook).

| Year | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Individual Income Tax | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -139 | -161 | -158 | -161 | -163 |
| Payroll Tax | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Corporate Income Tax | 0 | -34 | -53 | -59 | -62 | -70 | -77 | -70 | -59 | -55 |
| Estate And Gift Taxes | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -1 | -9 | -12 | -13 | -13 |
| Income Security Offsets (-) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 13 | 13 | 14 | 14 |
| Total revenue loss | 1 | 34 | 53 | 59 | 62 | 219 | 260 | 252 | 245 | 244 |

Table A8.3: Budgetary effects of extending provisions that expire under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (2017); In billions of dollars.
Source: PWBM staff estimates.

Table A8.3 shows PWBM staff estimates of budget effects during the 2020s of permanently extending expiring TCJA provisions. TCJA's full investment expensing provision is also extended and its effects are included in Table A8.3.

## A9.1 Detailed Decomposition of Generational Accounts Reported in Table 4.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | 553,958 | 566,418 | 302,343 | 10,548 | 13,549 | 47,493 | 940,351 | 157,026 | 131,007 | 26,202 | 19,410 | 52,748 | 386,393 |
| 2051 | -30 | 696,546 | 675,316 | 362,657 | 12,411 | 15,865 | 56,121 | 1,122,370 | 172,201 | 141,981 | 30,030 | 22,965 | 58,646 | 425,824 |
| 2041 | -20 | 721,564 | 820,407 | 426,048 | 15,020 | 20,310 | 68,109 | 1,349,893 | 258,236 | 218,246 | 36,068 | 26,904 | 88,875 | 628,329 |
| 2031 | -10 | 787,592 | 902,160 | 466,819 | 16,558 | 22,452 | 75,042 | 1,483,032 | 290,905 | 235,450 | 38,932 | 29,587 | 100,566 | 695,440 |
| 2021 | 0 | 926,766 | 961,863 | 506,338 | 17,850 | 22,988 | 81,896 | 1,590,935 | 275,842 | 220,646 | 38,057 | 32,179 | 97,444 | 664,169 |
| 2011 | 10 | 1,127,559 | 1,112,934 | 585,388 | 20,082 | 26,934 | 90,021 | 1,835,360 | 288,006 | 246,955 | 34,246 | 35,668 | 102,927 | 707,802 |
| 2001 | 20 | 1,244,020 | 1,218,116 | 640,864 | 22,060 | 29,417 | 97,935 | 2,008,393 | 311,914 | 269,982 | 30,117 | 37,990 | 114,371 | 764,373 |
| 1991 | 30 | 1,111,613 | 1,113,063 | 558,781 | 17,891 | 27,522 | 86,721 | 1,803,977 | 283,106 | 245,406 | 22,724 | 31,270 | 109,858 | 692,365 |
| 1981 | 40 | 894,904 | 1,158,729 | 498,347 | 17,483 | 32,447 | 89,509 | 1,796,514 | 373,920 | 319,697 | 23,302 | 28,030 | 156,660 | 901,610 |
| 1971 | 50 | 428,203 | 921,871 | 337,415 | 14,060 | 27,569 | 73,481 | 1,374,396 | 406,361 | 326,150 | 20,939 | 20,452 | 172,292 | 946,194 |
| 1961 | 60 | -61,473 | 766,131 | 227,199 | 12,585 | 24,994 | 67,347 | 1,098,256 | 541,613 | 370,032 | 18,206 | 16,545 | 213,333 | 1,159,730 |
| 1951 | 70 | -257,178 | 433,855 | 96,125 | 7,597 | 13,090 | 40,128 | 590,795 | 418,731 | 250,673 | 11,260 | 8,324 | 158,986 | 847,974 |
| 1941 | 80 | -188,691 | 270,836 | 54,023 | 4,965 | 7,096 | 26,808 | 363,728 | 276,037 | 150,445 | 8,447 | 5,421 | 112,069 | 552,419 |

[^19]| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | 123,040 | 374,084 | 217,500 | 12,858 | 5,544 | 42,572 | 652,559 | 201,850 | 222,308 | 55,944 | 20,398 | 29,020 | 529,519 |
| 2051 | -30 | 142,235 | 433,689 | 251,160 | 14,832 | 6,441 | 49,149 | 755,270 | 234,545 | 258,279 | 62,936 | 23,407 | 33,867 | 613,035 |
| 2041 | -20 | 195,202 | 468,461 | 274,644 | 15,966 | 6,775 | 53,126 | 818,972 | 237,716 | 259,630 | 66,385 | 25,568 | 34,470 | 623,770 |
| 2031 | -10 | 255,910 | 477,814 | 288,355 | 16,425 | 6,572 | 54,578 | 843,744 | 224,011 | 238,201 | 66,314 | 27,127 | 32,181 | 587,834 |
| 2021 | 0 | 289,357 | 565,761 | 333,631 | 19,433 | 7,958 | 65,121 | 991,904 | 273,300 | 284,684 | 72,396 | 31,114 | 41,053 | 702,547 |
| 2011 | 10 | 286,015 | 628,065 | 368,987 | 21,438 | 9,051 | 69,782 | 1,097,323 | 316,680 | 351,633 | 63,863 | 32,737 | 46,394 | 811,307 |
| 2001 | 20 | 377,594 | 680,473 | 405,068 | 23,219 | 9,352 | 74,554 | 1,192,665 | 320,881 | 357,686 | 53,945 | 34,010 | 48,550 | 815,072 |
| 1991 | 30 | 253,534 | 733,176 | 392,878 | 22,124 | 11,082 | 76,927 | 1,236,187 | 393,234 | 442,872 | 51,561 | 31,626 | 63,360 | 982,653 |
| 1981 | 40 | 103,922 | 636,498 | 300,025 | 18,355 | 10,720 | 67,600 | 1,033,197 | 377,756 | 415,977 | 45,625 | 24,563 | 65,355 | 929,276 |
| 1971 | 50 | -177,068 | 583,270 | 228,358 | 17,289 | 11,586 | 64,488 | 904,991 | 458,279 | 481,986 | 44,601 | 18,400 | 78,793 | 1,082,059 |
| 1961 | 60 | -454,880 | 420,494 | 131,888 | 13,851 | 9,434 | 49,844 | 625,510 | 489,524 | 458,622 | 42,056 | 12,000 | 78,188 | 1,080,390 |
| 1951 | 70 | -499,277 | 257,647 | 59,339 | 9,721 | 6,029 | 31,777 | 364,512 | 418,599 | 342,597 | 31,079 | 7,504 | 64,011 | 863,789 |
| 1941 | 80 | -313,136 | 142,474 | 31,367 | 6,035 | 3,165 | 16,876 | 199,918 | 254,161 | 191,762 | 22,318 | 5,348 | 39,464 | 513,054 |

## Table A9.2: The Composition of Generational Accounts for White College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth.

## (Present values in constant 2021 dollars)

Source: Authors' calculations.

* Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | -115,093 | 190,171 | 151,793 | 6,426 | 1,188 | 24,897 | 374,474 | 163,820 | 155,618 | 89,904 | 41,601 | 38,624 | 489,567 |
| 2051 | -30 | -95,171 | 217,604 | 174,905 | 7,247 | 1,338 | 28,031 | 429,126 | 171,255 | 162,493 | 101,774 | 47,638 | 41,137 | 524,297 |
| 2041 | -20 | -60,287 | 222,679 | 179,734 | 7,314 | 1,364 | 28,324 | 439,415 | 159,089 | 149,146 | 103,484 | 48,786 | 39,197 | 499,703 |
| 2031 | -10 | -68,330 | 232,154 | 188,933 | 7,752 | 1,367 | 30,039 | 460,246 | 169,249 | 159,234 | 107,848 | 52,078 | 40,167 | 528,577 |
| 2021 | 0 | -47,857 | 266,444 | 218,006 | 8,877 | 1,567 | 34,273 | 529,168 | 184,614 | 172,239 | 115,434 | 59,945 | 44,793 | 577,025 |
| 2011 | 10 | 8,021 | 295,273 | 241,237 | 9,709 | 1,753 | 36,154 | 584,126 | 185,723 | 176,887 | 101,789 | 63,401 | 48,305 | 576,105 |
| 2001 | 20 | -57,933 | 369,313 | 294,896 | 12,247 | 2,356 | 44,632 | 723,445 | 271,306 | 266,551 | 96,658 | 74,527 | 72,336 | 781,378 |
| 1991 | 30 | 17,107 | 316,233 | 249,122 | 9,377 | 2,071 | 35,758 | 612,561 | 204,411 | 197,318 | 68,627 | 65,367 | 59,731 | 595,454 |
| 1981 | 40 | -312,663 | 301,629 | 211,211 | 9,504 | 2,471 | 37,314 | 562,129 | 344,052 | 324,129 | 59,377 | 54,614 | 92,620 | 874,792 |
| 1971 | 50 | -402,570 | 240,368 | 151,542 | 8,050 | 2,206 | 32,248 | 434,414 | 356,605 | 300,434 | 43,830 | 39,382 | 96,734 | 836,984 |
| 1961 | 60 | -423,416 | 136,736 | 71,375 | 5,268 | 1,288 | 22,344 | 237,011 | 316,357 | 218,942 | 22,009 | 21,521 | 81,598 | 660,427 |
| 1951 | 70 | -528,312 | 87,838 | 29,656 | 4,242 | 718 | 18,227 | 140,682 | 344,704 | 225,497 | 10,169 | 11,446 | 77,177 | 668,994 |
| 1941 | 80 | -312,778 | 51,305 | 14,871 | 2,632 | 269 | 11,633 | 80,710 | 208,729 | 128,727 | 3,358 | 6,950 | 45,724 | 393,488 |

## Table A9.3: The Composition of Generational Accounts for White Non-College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth.

## (Present values in constant 2021 dollars)

Source: Authors' calculations.

* Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.

| Year of Birth | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | -306,322 | 123,578 | 93,002 | 6,875 | 1,881 | 22,543 | 247,879 | 178,331 | 191,227 | 117,974 | 51,023 | 15,646 | 554,201 |
| 2051 | -30 | -309,613 | 129,875 | 97,372 | 7,174 | 1,971 | 23,558 | 259,951 | 181,971 | 194,309 | 124,067 | 53,036 | 16,181 | 569,564 |
| 2041 | -20 | -315,316 | 146,208 | 109,957 | 7,933 | 2,235 | 26,185 | 292,518 | 191,537 | 200,348 | 138,847 | 59,809 | 17,293 | 607,834 |
| 2031 | -10 | -376,674 | 157,068 | 118,601 | 8,762 | 2,389 | 28,740 | 315,561 | 224,044 | 237,402 | 145,516 | 65,635 | 19,638 | 692,235 |
| 2021 | 0 | -431,198 | 172,353 | 128,684 | 9,819 | 2,603 | 32,528 | 345,987 | 263,169 | 273,515 | 146,555 | 70,693 | 23,254 | 777,185 |
| 2011 | 10 | -345,547 | 204,856 | 154,749 | 11,009 | 3,139 | 34,811 | 408,564 | 246,263 | 261,143 | 141,288 | 81,952 | 23,465 | 754,111 |
| 2001 | 20 | -444,567 | 238,670 | 178,947 | 13,140 | 3,647 | 39,895 | 474,298 | 315,462 | 351,960 | 127,762 | 93,681 | 30,000 | 918,866 |
| 1991 | 30 | -480,063 | 232,724 | 163,385 | 11,858 | 3,550 | 37,991 | 449,508 | 331,538 | 375,330 | 103,488 | 86,580 | 32,635 | 929,571 |
| 1981 | 40 | -368,391 | 202,604 | 131,235 | 9,954 | 2,840 | 33,040 | 379,673 | 274,137 | 311,693 | 75,870 | 56,582 | 29,781 | 748,064 |
| 1971 | 50 | -433,947 | 150,674 | 86,080 | 8,073 | 1,796 | 27,800 | 274,423 | 285,867 | 310,977 | 49,579 | 31,339 | 30,609 | 708,371 |
| 1961 | 60 | -612,142 | 103,580 | 47,795 | 6,983 | 1,065 | 24,126 | 183,548 | 363,832 | 348,975 | 30,996 | 18,470 | 33,416 | 795,689 |
| 1951 | 70 | -472,427 | 49,398 | 15,194 | 4,324 | 414 | 14,827 | 84,156 | 275,857 | 236,434 | 12,884 | 7,819 | 23,588 | 556,583 |
| 1941 | 80 | -307,053 | 23,103 | 7,936 | 2,740 | 179 | 8,673 | 42,630 | 179,136 | 145,473 | 5,455 | 4,928 | 14,692 | 349,684 |

## Table A9.4: The Composition of Generational Accounts for White Non-College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth.

## (Present values in constant 2021 dollars)

Source: Authors' calculations.

* Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.

| Year of Birth | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | 341,885 | 474,944 | 291,974 | 10,208 | 6,576 | 44,912 | 828,614 | 179,823 | 183,471 | 41,765 | 26,567 | 55,102 | 486,729 |
| 2051 | -30 | 385,430 | 533,038 | 328,257 | 11,464 | 7,414 | 50,386 | 930,559 | 201,361 | 205,887 | 47,189 | 29,801 | 60,890 | 545,129 |
| 2041 | -20 | 402,703 | 609,333 | 372,421 | 13,127 | 8,885 | 57,800 | 1,061,567 | 245,867 | 251,071 | 55,116 | 33,822 | 72,988 | 658,864 |
| 2031 | -10 | 494,565 | 664,118 | 408,744 | 14,200 | 9,091 | 62,501 | 1,158,653 | 245,064 | 250,178 | 56,851 | 37,011 | 74,984 | 664,088 |
| 2021 | 0 | 447,887 | 798,482 | 479,216 | 17,401 | 12,517 | 77,743 | 1,385,359 | 358,965 | 353,704 | 73,925 | 43,870 | 107,008 | 937,472 |
| 2011 | 10 | 639,524 | 844,788 | 517,236 | 17,900 | 11,660 | 77,711 | 1,469,295 | 306,821 | 315,600 | 64,859 | 45,297 | 97,194 | 829,771 |
| 2001 | 20 | 704,605 | 909,930 | 557,853 | 19,412 | 12,619 | 82,438 | 1,582,253 | 324,751 | 335,361 | 64,441 | 47,436 | 105,658 | 877,648 |
| 1991 | 30 | 720,079 | 954,603 | 553,939 | 17,517 | 13,416 | 84,200 | 1,623,675 | 337,014 | 338,986 | 63,621 | 46,375 | 117,600 | 903,596 |
| 1981 | 40 | 374,077 | 890,178 | 468,027 | 15,912 | 15,424 | 80,713 | 1,470,254 | 422,685 | 414,383 | 66,807 | 42,532 | 149,769 | 1,096,176 |
| 1971 | 50 | -54,787 | 664,633 | 314,720 | 12,660 | 14,834 | 65,883 | 1,072,730 | 459,688 | 415,332 | 59,967 | 32,646 | 159,885 | 1,127,518 |
| 1961 | 60 | -323,224 | 463,879 | 195,455 | 9,861 | 13,177 | 51,648 | 734,020 | 468,057 | 367,183 | 48,250 | 23,297 | 150,457 | 1,057,244 |
| 1951 | 70 | -373,589 | 263,663 | 88,060 | 6,348 | 8,795 | 35,181 | 402,047 | 372,446 | 246,988 | 29,248 | 11,157 | 115,796 | 775,635 |
| 1941 | 80 | -273,758 | 180,630 | 53,951 | 4,547 | 6,917 | 23,889 | 269,934 | 266,890 | 174,534 | 24,445 | 7,579 | 70,244 | 543,692 |

Table A9.5: The Composition of Generational Accounts for Non-White College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth.
(Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

* Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | 72,198 | 312,518 | 206,850 | 10,378 | 1,742 | 41,570 | 573,057 | 184,360 | 209,665 | 56,891 | 29,500 | 20,444 | 500,860 |
| 2051 | -30 | 80,482 | 339,151 | 225,791 | 11,320 | 1,871 | 45,226 | 623,359 | 199,716 | 227,182 | 61,650 | 32,351 | 21,978 | 542,877 |
| 2041 | -20 | 95,097 | 395,025 | 260,799 | 13,069 | 2,212 | 52,423 | 723,528 | 232,846 | 260,223 | 72,356 | 37,045 | 25,961 | 628,430 |
| 2031 | -10 | 83,550 | 422,051 | 279,100 | 14,025 | 2,323 | 56,681 | 774,180 | 258,005 | 286,107 | 77,825 | 40,103 | 28,589 | 690,630 |
| 2021 | 0 | 89,258 | 501,917 | 327,016 | 16,612 | 2,819 | 69,212 | 917,576 | 310,023 | 345,537 | 90,143 | 46,689 | 35,926 | 828,318 |
| 2011 | 10 | 168,274 | 515,105 | 344,617 | 17,159 | 2,846 | 66,498 | 946,225 | 288,189 | 328,885 | 81,221 | 47,856 | 31,801 | 777,951 |
| 2001 | 20 | 313,991 | 539,053 | 369,936 | 18,150 | 2,963 | 66,692 | 996,795 | 253,978 | 281,986 | 69,702 | 49,666 | 27,473 | 682,804 |
| 1991 | 30 | 135,516 | 593,976 | 368,204 | 17,816 | 3,597 | 73,469 | 1,057,062 | 349,203 | 398,881 | 83,267 | 49,359 | 40,836 | 921,546 |
| 1981 | 40 | -54,361 | 531,639 | 294,457 | 15,322 | 3,470 | 68,833 | 913,722 | 372,469 | 426,179 | 80,946 | 38,969 | 49,519 | 968,083 |
| 1971 | 50 | -291,563 | 448,811 | 214,508 | 13,080 | 3,112 | 63,323 | 742,834 | 414,506 | 454,568 | 76,679 | 28,829 | 59,815 | 1,034,397 |
| 1961 | 60 | -551,101 | 330,293 | 129,946 | 9,852 | 2,190 | 56,443 | 528,725 | 464,150 | 455,963 | 70,965 | 20,046 | 68,701 | 1,079,826 |
| 1951 | 70 | -440,018 | 171,114 | 48,208 | 4,792 | 850 | 36,124 | 261,088 | 308,635 | 288,446 | 48,359 | 10,217 | 45,448 | 701,106 |
| 1941 | 80 | -123,898 | 76,089 | 13,993 | 1,450 | 180 | 15,863 | 107,575 | 108,083 | 86,413 | 15,544 | 4,374 | 17,058 | 231,473 |

## Table A9.6: The Composition of Generational Accounts for Non-White College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth.

## (Present values in constant 2021 dollars)

Source: Authors' calculations.

* Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.

| $\begin{gathered} \text { Year } \\ \text { of } \\ \text { Birth } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | -257,371 | 125,807 | 115,905 | 6,419 | 187 | 21,446 | 269,763 | 125,240 | 173,878 | 138,828 | 59,070 | 30,118 | 527,135 |
| 2051 | -30 | -255,939 | 128,889 | 118,997 | 6,591 | 192 | 22,006 | 276,676 | 124,999 | 173,306 | 143,347 | 60,799 | 30,164 | 532,614 |
| 2041 | -20 | -249,730 | 148,891 | 137,953 | 7,479 | 214 | 24,914 | 319,450 | 128,420 | 178,506 | 160,907 | 70,098 | 31,250 | 569,180 |
| 2031 | -10 | -337,624 | 176,504 | 162,330 | 8,937 | 270 | 29,743 | 377,783 | 171,147 | 235,680 | 184,367 | 82,050 | 42,163 | 715,408 |
| 2021 | 0 | -398,648 | 187,610 | 171,981 | 9,753 | 277 | 33,376 | 402,997 | 206,616 | 271,708 | 185,424 | 88,143 | 49,754 | 801,645 |
| 2011 | 10 | -348,618 | 216,803 | 199,647 | 10,966 | 324 | 35,069 | 462,809 | 204,041 | 281,162 | 178,769 | 96,134 | 51,322 | 811,427 |
| 2001 | 20 | -315,764 | 237,719 | 219,226 | 12,027 | 339 | 37,270 | 506,580 | 211,291 | 291,932 | 161,672 | 102,027 | 55,421 | 822,344 |
| 1991 | 30 | -470,458 | 236,469 | 210,964 | 11,072 | 376 | 35,809 | 494,688 | 267,832 | 366,487 | 156,372 | 101,461 | 72,996 | 965,147 |
| 1981 | 40 | -338,836 | 172,296 | 149,982 | 8,068 | 334 | 26,128 | 356,809 | 195,671 | 254,841 | 112,991 | 73,553 | 58,588 | 695,645 |
| 1971 | 50 | -563,276 | 129,963 | 106,528 | 7,196 | 325 | 24,278 | 268,290 | 274,174 | 323,229 | 102,639 | 55,687 | 75,838 | 831,567 |
| 1961 | 60 | -430,450 | 63,655 | 47,824 | 4,329 | 184 | 15,085 | 131,077 | 215,983 | 200,703 | 55,631 | 29,576 | 59,634 | 561,527 |
| 1951 | 70 | -693,929 | 43,298 | 24,268 | 4,140 | 74 | 17,442 | 89,222 | 330,850 | 310,447 | 47,064 | 21,177 | 73,612 | 783,150 |
| 1941 | 80 | -162,917 | 12,856 | 5,189 | 1,153 | 0 | 5,576 | 24,775 | 82,712 | 66,760 | 10,669 | 6,840 | 20,711 | 187,692 |

Table A9.7: The Composition of Generational Accounts for Non-White Non-College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth.
(Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

* Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Generational Account | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Transfers |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Income | Payroll | Indirect | Estate | Other Taxes | All Taxes | Social Security | Medicare* | Medicaid | Welfare | Other | All <br> Transfers |
| 2061 | -40 | -443,991 | 71,637 | 70,079 | 5,988 | 77 | 17,770 | 165,550 | 132,648 | 193,447 | 191,242 | 83,024 | 9,181 | 609,542 |
| 2051 | -30 | -465,550 | 84,187 | 82,573 | 6,812 | 87 | 20,292 | 193,951 | 138,130 | 197,614 | 217,170 | 96,849 | 9,739 | 659,502 |
| 2041 | -20 | -564,616 | 90,007 | 88,163 | 7,593 | 93 | 22,484 | 208,340 | 170,132 | 247,676 | 238,534 | 104,919 | 11,695 | 772,957 |
| 2031 | -10 | -537,297 | 103,020 | 100,920 | 8,238 | 110 | 24,609 | 236,897 | 162,314 | 229,098 | 253,869 | 117,322 | 11,591 | 774,194 |
| 2021 | 0 | -600,551 | 110,252 | 107,936 | 9,175 | 114 | 27,188 | 254,664 | 191,442 | 262,938 | 259,732 | 127,454 | 13,648 | 855,215 |
| 2011 | 10 | -657,898 | 130,288 | 127,302 | 10,628 | 140 | 30,064 | 298,422 | 217,636 | 318,848 | 259,308 | 144,716 | 15,811 | 956,320 |
| 2001 | 20 | -637,677 | 134,421 | 132,195 | 11,209 | 133 | 30,179 | 308,136 | 222,793 | 331,362 | 224,332 | 150,609 | 16,718 | 945,813 |
| 1991 | 30 | -564,994 | 132,236 | 125,250 | 9,930 | 149 | 27,691 | 295,256 | 203,300 | 298,907 | 195,817 | 145,921 | 16,305 | 860,250 |
| 1981 | 40 | -561,102 | 103,741 | 95,283 | 8,321 | 154 | 23,318 | 230,817 | 206,453 | 310,230 | 160,756 | 97,944 | 16,536 | 791,920 |
| 1971 | 50 | -631,038 | 74,134 | 65,231 | 7,181 | 154 | 19,820 | 166,519 | 240,423 | 340,563 | 138,126 | 60,514 | 17,930 | 797,557 |
| 1961 | 60 | -674,387 | 39,268 | 31,436 | 5,705 | 101 | 15,346 | 91,855 | 270,271 | 338,820 | 100,882 | 36,952 | 19,317 | 766,242 |
| 1951 | 70 | -328,248 | 12,134 | 7,390 | 2,685 | 29 | 6,856 | 29,094 | 141,286 | 152,941 | 38,604 | 14,723 | 9,789 | 357,342 |
| 1941 | 80 | -265,301 | 6,128 | 4,379 | 2,315 | 0 | 5,302 | 18,124 | 116,276 | 119,375 | 28,101 | 11,780 | 7,892 | 283,425 |

## Table A9.8: The Composition of Generational Accounts for Non-White Non-College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth.

## (Present values in constant 2021 dollars)

Source: Authors' calculations.

* Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.


## A10. Detailed Decomposition of Welfare Transfers (Welfare column reported in Tables A9.1-9.8)

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Welfare Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family support and foster care | Earned income, child, and other tax credits | Health <br> Insurance <br> Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 19,410 | 1,219 | 2,983 | 1,530 | 541 | 1,460 | 4,690 | 1,058 | 3,236 | 1,183 | 1,509 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 22,965 | 1,470 | 3,545 | 1,757 | 655 | 1,758 | 5,525 | 1,248 | 3,898 | 1,382 | 1,726 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 26,904 | 1,742 | 4,343 | 1,955 | 755 | 2,000 | 6,447 | 1,578 | 4,521 | 1,624 | 1,938 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 29,587 | 1,910 | 4,789 | 2,158 | 825 | 2,184 | 7,095 | 1,757 | 4,955 | 1,792 | 2,122 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 32,179 | 2,069 | 5,105 | 2,408 | 912 | 2,426 | 7,757 | 1,819 | 5,417 | 1,972 | 2,290 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 35,668 | 2,377 | 5,845 | 2,644 | 1,040 | 2,770 | 8,689 | 2,045 | 6,327 | 2,158 | 1,774 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 37,990 | 2,611 | 6,428 | 2,323 | 1,141 | 3,213 | 9,362 | 2,216 | 6,921 | 2,651 | 1,123 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 31,270 | 2,376 | 6,081 | 752 | 1,074 | 3,040 | 6,556 | 2,015 | 6,886 | 1,548 | 917 | 26 |
| 1981 | 40 | 28,030 | 2,054 | 6,331 | 249 | 794 | 2,287 | 4,848 | 2,341 | 6,920 | 1,410 | 777 | 19 |
| 1971 | 50 | 20,452 | 1,337 | 5,181 | 90 | 418 | 1,346 | 3,197 | 2,111 | 5,389 | 1,062 | 297 | 24 |
| 1961 | 60 | 16,545 | 928 | 4,720 | 45 | 227 | 627 | 2,773 | 1,966 | 4,282 | 872 | 84 | 20 |
| 1951 | 70 | 8,324 | 474 | 2,697 | 14 | 118 | 172 | 1,698 | 1,066 | 1,457 | 543 | 30 | 55 |
| 1941 | 80 | 5,421 | 307 | 1,871 | 5 | 80 | 114 | 1,114 | 754 | 592 | 492 | 16 | 74 |

Table A10.1: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for White College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth.
(Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

| Year of Birth | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Welfare <br> Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family support and foster care | Earned income, child, and other tax credits | Health Insurance Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 20,398 | 930 | 866 | 1,243 | 1,034 | 2,464 | 5,103 | 3,160 | 2,718 | 1,513 | 1,367 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 23,407 | 1,077 | 1,002 | 1,405 | 1,194 | 2,839 | 5,862 | 3,596 | 3,146 | 1,741 | 1,546 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 25,568 | 1,181 | 1,082 | 1,553 | 1,308 | 3,146 | 6,387 | 3,897 | 3,415 | 1,884 | 1,716 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 27,127 | 1,249 | 1,102 | 1,715 | 1,388 | 3,417 | 6,782 | 4,062 | 3,560 | 1,979 | 1,873 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 31,114 | 1,438 | 1,317 | 1,916 | 1,598 | 3,837 | 7,785 | 4,667 | 4,179 | 2,333 | 2,039 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 32,737 | 1,590 | 1,449 | 2,095 | 1,766 | 4,251 | 8,623 | 4,169 | 4,592 | 2,531 | 1,672 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 34,010 | 1,761 | 1,582 | 1,893 | 1,956 | 4,870 | 9,277 | 3,437 | 5,030 | 2,960 | 1,245 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 31,626 | 1,785 | 1,747 | 600 | 2,028 | 5,054 | 7,622 | 3,407 | 5,752 | 2,438 | 1,157 | 37 |
| 1981 | 40 | 24,563 | 1,278 | 1,512 | 231 | 1,510 | 3,836 | 5,283 | 3,142 | 4,956 | 1,968 | 824 | 23 |
| 1971 | 50 | 18,400 | 815 | 1,470 | 97 | 955 | 1,859 | 3,963 | 3,182 | 4,194 | 1,556 | 291 | 18 |
| 1961 | 60 | 12,000 | 406 | 1,082 | 46 | 488 | 381 | 2,772 | 2,486 | 2,977 | 1,242 | 92 | 28 |
| 1951 | 70 | 7,504 | 193 | 606 | 15 | 298 | 79 | 1,973 | 1,658 | 1,603 | 958 | 53 | 67 |
| 1941 | 80 | 5,348 | 114 | 378 | 7 | 190 | 39 | 1,242 | 1,089 | 1,381 | 800 | 30 | 80 |

Table A10.2: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for White College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth.
(Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

| $\begin{gathered} \text { Year } \\ \text { of } \\ \text { Birth } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Welfare <br> Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family support and foster care | Earned income, child, and other tax credits | Health Insurance Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 41,601 | 581 | 4,526 | 677 | 1,224 | 5,358 | 7,425 | 7,636 | 5,845 | 5,780 | 2,550 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 47,638 | 664 | 5,100 | 772 | 1,405 | 6,227 | 8,527 | 8,660 | 6,763 | 6,640 | 2,881 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 48,786 | 675 | 5,147 | 785 | 1,438 | 6,377 | 8,693 | 8,937 | 6,977 | 6,784 | 2,973 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 52,078 | 712 | 5,348 | 880 | 1,506 | 6,896 | 9,310 | 9,431 | 7,339 | 7,325 | 3,329 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 59,945 | 813 | 6,069 | 1,037 | 1,720 | 8,046 | 10,796 | 10,765 | 8,472 | 8,510 | 3,717 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 63,401 | 897 | 6,703 | 1,109 | 1,909 | 8,790 | 11,812 | 10,624 | 9,390 | 9,285 | 2,882 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 74,527 | 1,116 | 8,740 | 1,017 | 2,379 | 10,585 | 13,993 | 11,665 | 11,365 | 11,636 | 2,030 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 65,367 | 946 | 7,924 | 360 | 2,203 | 10,996 | 10,670 | 9,454 | 11,947 | 9,120 | 1,654 | 93 |
| 1981 | 40 | 54,614 | 831 | 8,768 | 130 | 2,018 | 6,947 | 8,092 | 9,544 | 10,609 | 6,538 | 1,053 | 84 |
| 1971 | 50 | 39,382 | 591 | 7,758 | 58 | 1,490 | 2,922 | 5,341 | 8,400 | 8,146 | 4,182 | 414 | 80 |
| 1961 | 60 | 21,521 | 312 | 5,095 | 26 | 759 | 983 | 2,782 | 4,568 | 4,572 | 2,191 | 145 | 88 |
| 1951 | 70 | 11,446 | 234 | 4,184 | 9 | 497 | 274 | 1,742 | 1,651 | 1,429 | 1,272 | 76 | 79 |
| 1941 | 80 | 6,950 | 145 | 2,792 | 4 | 312 | 126 | 1,039 | 885 | 786 | 753 | 39 | 69 |

## Table A10.3: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for White Non-College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth. <br> (Present values in constant 2021 dollars) <br> Source: Authors' calculations.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ \mathbf{2 0 2 1} \end{gathered}$ | Welfare Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family <br> support <br> and foster care | Earned income, child, and other tax credits | Health <br> Insurance <br> Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 51,023 | 386 | 662 | 766 | 5,310 | 12,107 | 7,513 | 8,347 | 3,378 | 9,436 | 3,119 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 53,036 | 406 | 691 | 803 | 5,486 | 12,499 | 7,805 | 8,772 | 3,538 | 9,789 | 3,248 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 59,809 | 460 | 765 | 887 | 6,200 | 14,117 | 8,772 | 9,907 | 4,011 | 10,967 | 3,722 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 65,635 | 494 | 835 | 1,009 | 6,799 | 15,658 | 9,624 | 10,673 | 4,303 | 12,175 | 4,064 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 70,693 | 534 | 943 | 1,063 | 7,341 | 16,614 | 10,438 | 11,634 | 4,673 | 13,159 | 4,289 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 81,952 | 649 | 1,064 | 1,241 | 8,773 | 20,050 | 12,351 | 12,799 | 5,657 | 15,459 | 3,910 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 93,681 | 745 | 1,281 | 1,115 | 10,148 | 24,054 | 14,160 | 13,726 | 6,505 | 18,739 | 3,209 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 86,580 | 682 | 1,318 | 374 | 9,601 | 23,800 | 11,933 | 13,075 | 7,237 | 15,666 | 2,722 | 172 |
| 1981 | 40 | 56,582 | 533 | 1,190 | 133 | 5,872 | 12,530 | 8,339 | 11,056 | 6,282 | 9,144 | 1,356 | 148 |
| 1971 | 50 | 31,339 | 324 | 1,070 | 50 | 3,078 | 3,439 | 4,784 | 8,185 | 4,776 | 5,076 | 437 | 119 |
| 1961 | 60 | 18,470 | 174 | 856 | 17 | 1,799 | 837 | 2,917 | 5,225 | 2,994 | 3,313 | 214 | 123 |
| 1951 | 70 | 7,819 | 53 | 525 | 3 | 862 | 157 | 1,501 | 1,847 | 858 | 1,786 | 96 | 132 |
| 1941 | 80 | 4,928 | 13 | 356 | 0 | 577 | 83 | 938 | 1,094 | 420 | 1,255 | 53 | 140 |

Table A10.4: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for White Non-College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth.
(Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ \mathbf{2 0 2 1} \end{gathered}$ | Welfare Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family support and foster care | ```Earned income, child, and other tax credits``` | Health Insurance Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 26,567 | 1,204 | 1,874 | 1,193 | 609 | 3,085 | 7,133 | 3,004 | 3,905 | 2,437 | 2,122 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 29,801 | 1,358 | 2,089 | 1,341 | 686 | 3,481 | 8,009 | 3,349 | 4,380 | 2,739 | 2,371 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 33,822 | 1,532 | 2,413 | 1,488 | 781 | 3,931 | 9,049 | 3,899 | 4,932 | 3,137 | 2,658 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 37,011 | 1,697 | 2,609 | 1,650 | 855 | 4,345 | 9,927 | 4,138 | 5,467 | 3,396 | 2,926 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 43,870 | 1,942 | 3,282 | 1,849 | 1,020 | 4,986 | 11,672 | 5,325 | 6,343 | 4,225 | 3,222 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 45,297 | 2,148 | 3,345 | 2,029 | 1,086 | 5,491 | 12,480 | 4,891 | 6,935 | 4,291 | 2,600 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 47,436 | 2,311 | 3,628 | 1,879 | 1,172 | 6,002 | 13,366 | 4,924 | 7,503 | 4,826 | 1,825 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 46,375 | 2,413 | 4,038 | 796 | 1,255 | 6,783 | 11,395 | 5,046 | 8,491 | 4,505 | 1,590 | 64 |
| 1981 | 40 | 42,532 | 1,848 | 4,337 | 363 | 1,144 | 5,944 | 9,390 | 5,639 | 8,177 | 4,264 | 1,368 | 59 |
| 1971 | 50 | 32,646 | 1,002 | 3,978 | 179 | 793 | 3,924 | 6,705 | 5,400 | 6,460 | 3,406 | 731 | 69 |
| 1961 | 60 | 23,297 | 450 | 3,156 | 87 | 494 | 1,620 | 4,911 | 4,531 | 5,013 | 2,634 | 322 | 78 |
| 1951 | 70 | 11,157 | 137 | 1,698 | 6 | 242 | 470 | 2,452 | 2,893 | 1,405 | 1,626 | 149 | 80 |
| 1941 | 80 | 7,579 | 70 | 1,197 | 6 | 170 | 337 | 1,520 | 2,080 | 726 | 1,296 | 91 | 86 |

Table A10.5: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for Non-White College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth.
(Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

| Year of Birth | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Welfare <br> Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family support and foster care | Earned income, child, and other tax credits | Health Insurance Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 29,500 | 745 | 476 | 1,377 | 1,999 | 5,381 | 7,028 | 3,203 | 3,183 | 3,801 | 2,306 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 32,351 | 815 | 519 | 1,536 | 2,194 | 5,933 | 7,720 | 3,461 | 3,463 | 4,162 | 2,548 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 37,045 | 939 | 601 | 1,712 | 2,509 | 6,746 | 8,819 | 4,046 | 4,022 | 4,780 | 2,872 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 40,103 | 1,003 | 646 | 1,884 | 2,722 | 7,295 | 9,565 | 4,385 | 4,278 | 5,197 | 3,129 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 46,689 | 1,171 | 764 | 2,121 | 3,171 | 8,374 | 11,103 | 5,264 | 5,055 | 6,195 | 3,466 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 47,856 | 1,254 | 790 | 2,305 | 3,347 | 9,116 | 11,701 | 4,926 | 5,292 | 6,274 | 2,851 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 49,666 | 1,369 | 836 | 2,051 | 3,558 | 10,333 | 12,274 | 4,627 | 5,697 | 6,794 | 2,128 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 49,359 | 1,390 | 956 | 740 | 3,695 | 11,060 | 10,392 | 5,640 | 6,784 | 6,632 | 1,967 | 103 |
| 1981 | 40 | 38,969 | 1,012 | 870 | 368 | 2,554 | 8,017 | 7,693 | 5,709 | 5,792 | 5,449 | 1,411 | 94 |
| 1971 | 50 | 28,829 | 597 | 616 | 181 | 1,708 | 3,947 | 5,757 | 5,837 | 4,917 | 4,522 | 670 | 75 |
| 1961 | 60 | 20,046 | 259 | 445 | 67 | 1,219 | 1,227 | 4,052 | 5,248 | 3,447 | 3,608 | 394 | 80 |
| 1951 | 70 | 10,217 | 68 | 263 | 19 | 713 | 374 | 2,049 | 3,061 | 1,170 | 2,192 | 207 | 101 |
| 1941 | 80 | 4,374 | 16 | 123 | 0 | 272 | 207 | 758 | 1,175 | 455 | 1,157 | 65 | 146 |

## Table A10.6: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for Non-White College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth. <br> (Present values in constant 2021 dollars) <br> Source: Authors' calculations.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Welfare <br> Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family <br> support <br> and foster care | Earned income, child, and other tax credits | Health <br> Insurance <br> Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 59,070 | 437 | 514 | 594 | 2,739 | 10,790 | 9,038 | 12,251 | 4,887 | 11,908 | 5,912 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 60,799 | 448 | 527 | 624 | 2,797 | 11,077 | 9,283 | 12,581 | 5,015 | 12,280 | 6,167 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 70,098 | 516 | 605 | 717 | 3,223 | 13,101 | 10,731 | 14,095 | 5,808 | 14,098 | 7,204 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 82,050 | 612 | 719 | 807 | 3,845 | 15,016 | 12,610 | 17,100 | 6,857 | 16,449 | 8,035 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 88,143 | 654 | 773 | 878 | 4,135 | 15,954 | 13,500 | 18,420 | 7,279 | 18,073 | 8,466 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 96,134 | 752 | 884 | 998 | 4,718 | 18,627 | 15,533 | 18,920 | 8,421 | 20,289 | 6,991 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 102,027 | 820 | 978 | 882 | 5,183 | 20,937 | 16,856 | 18,703 | 9,241 | 23,626 | 4,802 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 101,461 | 798 | 1,026 | 355 | 5,551 | 23,525 | 15,858 | 19,566 | 10,620 | 19,901 | 4,060 | 200 |
| 1981 | 40 | 73,553 | 559 | 736 | 180 | 4,171 | 16,987 | 10,892 | 15,537 | 8,545 | 13,184 | 2,585 | 175 |
| 1971 | 50 | 55,687 | 417 | 617 | 89 | 3,234 | 8,662 | 7,857 | 16,183 | 7,011 | 10,100 | 1,321 | 194 |
| 1961 | 60 | 29,576 | 202 | 337 | 39 | 1,573 | 3,240 | 3,581 | 9,901 | 4,055 | 5,865 | 534 | 249 |
| 1951 | 70 | 21,177 | 159 | 261 | 25 | 1,286 | 1,134 | 2,691 | 7,547 | 1,901 | 5,499 | 411 | 262 |
| 1941 | 80 | 6,840 | 30 | 87 | 6 | 386 | 418 | 734 | 1,959 | 744 | 2,092 | 99 | 286 |

Table A10.7: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for Non-White Non-College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth. (Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Year } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Birth } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Age } \\ \text { in } \\ 2021 \end{gathered}$ | Welfare <br> Programs | Present Values of Remaining Lifetime Taxes |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Medicareeligible <br> Retiree HC Fund <br> (MERHCF) | Agriculture | Higher education | Family <br> support <br> and foster care | Earned income, child, and other tax credits | Health <br> Insurance <br> Premium tax credits | Supplemental Security Income | Unemployment compensation | Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program | Child nutrition | Emergency rental assistance |
| 2061 | -40 | 83,024 | 203 | 111 | 631 | 12,703 | 21,340 | 6,684 | 13,570 | 3,269 | 17,822 | 6,692 | 0 |
| 2051 | -30 | 96,849 | 239 | 131 | 740 | 14,905 | 25,357 | 7,862 | 15,277 | 3,860 | 20,714 | 7,763 | 0 |
| 2041 | -20 | 104,919 | 256 | 140 | 801 | 16,039 | 27,001 | 8,430 | 17,106 | 4,115 | 22,537 | 8,494 | 0 |
| 2031 | -10 | 117,322 | 292 | 159 | 889 | 18,025 | 30,569 | 9,569 | 18,641 | 4,714 | 25,025 | 9,439 | 0 |
| 2021 | 0 | 127,454 | 313 | 172 | 962 | 19,578 | 32,987 | 10,302 | 20,484 | 5,053 | 27,519 | 10,068 | 0 |
| 2011 | 10 | 144,716 | 371 | 202 | 1,109 | 23,014 | 38,787 | 12,118 | 22,426 | 5,944 | 31,858 | 8,888 | 0 |
| 2001 | 20 | 150,609 | 383 | 211 | 957 | 24,003 | 42,409 | 12,481 | 21,921 | 6,162 | 35,513 | 6,568 | 0 |
| 1991 | 30 | 145,921 | 378 | 221 | 367 | 23,675 | 45,165 | 11,579 | 21,378 | 7,223 | 29,774 | 5,731 | 430 |
| 1981 | 40 | 97,944 | 281 | 175 | 161 | 14,041 | 27,231 | 8,262 | 19,342 | 5,727 | 19,154 | 3,180 | 390 |
| 1971 | 50 | 60,514 | 184 | 108 | 72 | 7,826 | 9,341 | 5,364 | 18,538 | 4,323 | 12,944 | 1,469 | 345 |
| 1961 | 60 | 36,952 | 94 | 52 | 33 | 4,356 | 2,471 | 2,751 | 14,411 | 2,432 | 9,162 | 835 | 354 |
| 1951 | 70 | 14,723 | 27 | 20 | 13 | 1,738 | 601 | 837 | 5,707 | 650 | 4,403 | 328 | 398 |
| 1941 | 80 | 11,780 | 14 | 17 | 20 | 1,423 | 318 | 590 | 4,679 | 394 | 3,689 | 222 | 413 |

Table A10.8: The Composition of Generational Accounts Welfare Programs for Non-White Non-College-Educated Females by Selected Years of Birth.
(Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
Source: Authors' calculations.

## A11. Sensitivity of FI and GI to Productivity Growth and Discount Rate Assumptions

The FI measures reported above are based on discounting projections of nominal future dollar flows of federal taxes and expenditures. Nominal future dollar flows are projected by (1) distributing CBO budget aggregates for various programs through the year 2030 across population subgroups distinguished by age, gender, race and education, (2) growing per-capita values annually for years after 2030 by applying a labor productivity growth rate, and applying an actuarial discount rate based on population survival rates to find present values as of $2021 .{ }^{42}$ Labor productivity growth rates are projected based on the PWBM microsimulation. These yearspecific growth rates are derived by estimating national output based on the microsimulation's annual projections of the efficiency-adjusted labor input and capital services, and dividing by the unadjusted labor input (total work hours). The resulting time series of (nominal) labor productivity growth is 3.51 percent per year.

|  | 2021-95 |  |  | Infinite Horizon |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | g-0.5\% | $\mathrm{g}=3.51 \%$ | g+0.5\% | g-0.5\% | $\mathrm{g}=3.51 \%$ | g+0.5\% |
| PVGDP |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| r-1.0\% | 1527.1 | 1828.6 | 2212.1 | 4163.3 | 10406.3 | 40718.5 |
| $\mathrm{r}=4.39 \%$ | 1109.6 | 1300.3 | 1539.4 | 1635.3 | 2410.0 | 4316.7 |
| r+1.0\% | 841.4 | 966.4 | 1120.5 | 1001.6 | 1254.8 | 1671.7 |
| FI |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| r-1.0\% | 127.2 | 147.3 | 172.5 | 488.3 | 1305.8 | 5233.8 |
| $\mathrm{r}=4.39 \%$ | 92.4 | 104.3 | 119.1 | 160.1 | 244.8 | 466.6 |
| r+1.0\% | 71.2 | 78.4 | 87.3 | 91.0 | 113.1 | 152.1 |
| FI/PVGDP |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| r-1.0\% | 8.33 | 8.05 | 7.80 | 11.73 | 12.55 | 12.85 |
| $\mathrm{r}=4.39 \%$ | 8.33 | 8.02 | 7.73 | 9.79 | 10.16 | 10.81 |
| r+1.0\% | 8.46 | 8.11 | 7.79 | 9.09 | 9.02 | 9.10 |

Table 5: Sensitivity of FI to alternative discount rate and productivity growth rate assumptions. Source: Author's calculations.

[^20]To account for future uncertainty on productivity and interest discount rates, we report FI measures under alternative values for these parameters. Table 5 shows FI measured under a +/0.5 percent variation in the productivity growth rates (in each future year) and a $+/-1.0$ percent variation in the interest discount factor. The FI measure is shown in present value dollars and as a share of PVGDP estimated under the same parametric variations of productivity and interest rates. The Table shows that FI estimates in present value (in constant 2021 dollars) are quite variable across alternative labor productivity growth and discount rates. But ratio FI/PVGDP is quite stable because variations in the two parameters change the numerator and denominator in the same direction and approximately in the same proportion.

## A12. Faster Labor Productivity Growth and the Ratio of FI to the Present Value of GDP

Over the 2021-95 time window, FI/PVGDP ratios shown in Table 5 decline when assumed labor productivity growth, $g$, is increased. This result challenges conventional wisdom that a higher growth rate would ease the federal government's financial condition. The conventional view, however, appears to be based on finite horizon estimates of the federal financial condition. A fuller picture, under infinite horizon estimates suggests that higher labor productivity growth rate would worsen the federal government's financial condition. That's because the largest government transfer programs (Medicare and Social Security) provide benefits to older populations financed by taxes levied on younger populations in each period. When the population is not aging rapidly, productivity growth effects on the numerator and denominator of the FI/PVGDP ratio cancel out. However, when the population is aging rapidly, the numerator (the difference between federal outlays and receipts) increases more than proportionally than the increase in the denominator. Stated briefly, when labor productivity (output per worker) is higher, annual increases in GDP follow the growth rate $(1+g)\left(1+n^{w}\right)$,
where $n^{w}$ is the growth rate of workers. However, the growth rate of FI is determined by $(1+g)\left(n^{w}-n^{b}\right)$, where $n^{b}$ is growth in the population transfer recipients. Over time, an increase in $g$ spurs both tax payments and transfer receipts. However, because of population aging, the transfer-recipient population (predominantly retirees) increases faster compared to the population that provides labor input and pays taxes - mainly working-aged- individuals. ${ }^{43}$

Figure 6 shows projected aged dependency ratios calculated from the PWBM microsimulation as the population of retirement aged (65+) individuals divided by the workingaged (15-64) individuals. This ratio is projected to increase during future decades, and to continue increasing well beyond the year 2095 - suggesting a near-stationary worker population and a growing retiree population. Hence, when $g$ is increased, the positive interaction between higher $g$ and the larger future population of (retiree) beneficiaries is stronger than that between higher $g$ and the number of workers who produce GDP. Hence, a higher value of $g$ increases future deficits by more than in proportion to the increase in GDP, causing the FI/PVGDP ratio to increase. From Table 5, the differential interaction effect of $g$ with worker and beneficiary populations is not explicitly visible over the shorter 75-year time window because it takes a long time for the positive interaction of $g$ with net beneficiary recipients to grow significantly larger than the interaction of higher $g$ with net tax payers. Over the infinite horizon, however, the dominance of the positive interaction of $g$ with net transfer recipients is clearly visible - and it is stronger at low values of $r$, which confers larger weights on deficits accruing in the more distant future.

[^21]

Figure 6: Projected populations of the working aged (15-64), retirement aged (65+) and the aged dependency ratio (right axis, percent).
Source: Authors' calculations from the PWBM microsimulation.
To verify that it is indeed the interaction of higher productivity growth with population aging, we recalculate the FI/PVGDP ratios of Table 4 by allowing the (microsimulation) population's to grow as projected but hold its age distribution constant after the year 2021.

|  |  | FI/PVGDP (Infinite Horizon; Base Case of Table 4) |  |  | FI/PVGDP (Infinite Horizon; Fixed age distribution after 2021) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | g-0.5\% | $\mathrm{g}=3.51 \%$ | g+0.5\% | g-0.5\% | $\mathrm{g}=3.51 \%$ | g+0.5\% |
| r-1.0\% | 11.73 | 12.55 | 12.85 | -5.73 | -5.29 | -4.95 |
| $\mathrm{r}=4.39 \%$ | 9.79 | 10.16 | 10.81 | -6.24 | -5.73 | -5.25 |
| r+1.0\% | 9.09 | 9.02 | 9.10 | -6.85 | -6.32 | -5.80 |

Table 6: FI-to-PVGDP ratios under alternative population aging scenarios. Source: Authors' calculations from the PWBM microsimulation.

In Table 6, the first panel repeats the infinite horizon FI/PVGDP ratios of Table 5 - the "base case." The $2^{\text {nd }}$ panel shows the same calculations under the case of constant population age distribution after 2021. Under the latter case, all FI/PVGDP ratios are considerably smaller than under the base case. The reason is simply that with no population aging, the relative size of older net transfer recipients does not grow as fast as under the base case relative to the size of the population of workers who are predominantly taxpayers. Moreover, for each value of the
discount rate (each row of Table 5), the FI/PVGDP ratio declines at higher values of labor productivity growth. This is because the deficit-increasing effect of faster labor productivity growth is not boosted by interaction with population aging. This interaction effect is formally described below.

Labor Productivity Growth, Population Aging, and the Share of FI in the Present Value of GDP
Let $Y$ denote Output (GDP); $W$ the number of workers/hours; $n^{w}$ the worker population/hours growth rate; $Y / W$ labor productivity; $g$ labor productivity growth rate $\frac{1}{Y / W} \frac{d(Y / W)}{d t}$. This yields the expression for total output: $Y=\left(\frac{Y}{W}\right) * W$, and output growth $\frac{1}{Y} \frac{d Y}{d t}=\frac{1}{Y / W} \frac{d(Y / W)}{d t}+\frac{1}{W} \frac{d W}{d t}=g+n^{w}$.

Then, the present value of all future output is given by
$P V_{-} Y=Y_{0} \sum_{s=0}^{\infty}\left(1+g+n^{w}\right)(1+r)^{-s}$
Similarly, let $\tau^{w}$ represent taxes per worker, which are assumed to grow at rate $g$, and which makes revenue $\tau^{w} W$ and revenue growth equals $g+n^{w}$.

Let $b^{r}$ represent benefits per retiree, also assumed to grow at rate $g$. Let $R$ be the number of retirees and $n^{r}$ the retiree population growth rate. Thus, benefit outlays are $b^{r} R$ and the benefit growth rate equals $g+n^{r}$.

Debt, D , accumulates from period to period - accruing service charges on prior debt plus the current deficit:
$D_{1}=D_{0}(1+r)+\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right)$
Where $E_{t}$ denotes non-interest expenditures and $R_{t}$ denotes revenues.
Successive period's debts can be expressed by manipulating the debt transition equation (A.11.2) as follows:
$D_{2}=D_{1}(1+r)+\left(E_{1}-R_{1}\right)=D_{0}(1+r)^{2}+\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right)(1+r)+\left(E_{1}-R_{1}\right)$, and
$D_{n}=D_{0}(1+r)^{n}+\sum_{s=0}^{n-1}\left(E_{s}-R_{s}\right)(1+r)^{n-1-s}$.
Since $E_{s}=E_{0}\left(1+g+n^{r}\right)^{s}$ and $R_{s}=R_{0}\left(1+g+n^{w}\right)^{s}, s=0 \ldots n-1$, we can write $D_{n}=D_{0}(1+r)^{n}+\sum_{s=0}^{n-1}\left[E_{0}\left(1+g+n^{r}\right)^{s}-R_{0}\left(1+g+n^{w}\right)^{s}\right](1+r)^{n-1-s}$.

With the population's age structure in a steady state, that is, with $n^{r}=n^{w}=n$, the term inside the square brackets collapses to $\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right)(1+g+n)^{s}$
$D_{n}=D_{0}(1+r)^{n}+\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right) \sum_{s=1}^{n}(1+g+n)^{s}(1+r)^{n-s}$.
Dividing both sides by $(1+r)^{n}$
$D_{n}(1+r)^{-n}=D_{0}+\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right) \sum_{s=1}^{n}(1+g+n)^{s}(1+r)^{-s}$
Letting $n \rightarrow \infty$, write
$F I=D_{0}+\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right) \sum_{s=1}^{\infty}(1+g+n)^{s}(1+r)^{-s}$.
Starting from a position of zero outstanding debt, $D_{0}=0$, we have
$\frac{F I}{P V_{-} Y}=\frac{\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right) \sum_{s=1}^{\infty}(1+g+n)^{s}(1+r)^{-s}}{Y_{0} \sum_{s=1}^{\infty}(1+g+n)^{s}(1+r)^{-s}}=\frac{\left(E_{0}-R_{0}\right)}{Y_{0}}$,
which is invariant to changes in the labor productivity growth rate $g$.
However, when $n^{r}>n^{w}$, that is, when the population is aging, the invariance result does not obtain as the numerator grows faster than the denominator.
$\frac{F I}{P V_{-} Y}=\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{n}\left[E_{0}\left(1+g+n^{r}\right)^{s}-R_{0}\left(1+g+n^{w}\right)^{s}\right](1+r)^{n-s}}{Y_{0} \sum_{s=1}^{\infty}\left(1+g+n^{w}\right)^{s}(1+r)^{-s}}$.
With non-zero initial debt, if it is small relative to the future component of FI, then the response of FI to changes in $g$ would be in the same ball park. If initial debt is huge, then the response would be closer to the invariance type.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ For instance, lawmakers may change fiscal laws upon learning that current laws imply a large FI, thereby invalidating the basis of the pre law-change FI measurement.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ The PWBM microsimulation projects future births, deaths, immigration, immigration status (legal and undocumented), fertility, emigration, spatial population distribution and migration within the United States, family formation and dissolution (marriage and divorce), family size distributions, race and ethnicity, education, employment type (wage worker or self-employed), labor supply (hours worked), labor earnings, disability, retirement, and many other demographic features. A detailed technical description of the microsimulation is available at: https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.edu/microsim/documentation.
    ${ }^{3}$ The onset of Covid-19 during early 2020 prompted the federal government to enact massive economic-support packages to curb surging unemployment, sustain production, produce and purchase vaccines, and develop therapies to strengthen infection and disease mitigation. Anti-Covid-19 legislation enacted since early 2020 includes P.L. 116123: Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2020; P.L. 116-127: Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA); P.L. 116-136: Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act); P.L. 116-139: Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act (PPPHCE Act); P.L. 116-260: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (CAA); and P.L. 117-2: American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARP). The debt-to-GDP ratios cited in the text are those reported by the Congressional Budget Office.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ The FI measure encompasses all federal accounts. The OASDHI component of FI includes assets (nonmarketable treasury securities) held in OASDHI trust funds. However, those trust fund assets, being liabilities of the U.S. Treasury, cancel out under federal-government-wide calculation of FI.
    ${ }^{5}$ Calculated from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis between 1982 and 2021. These data suggest that inflation in health care goods and services has exceed general inflation at the rate of 1.87 percent per year since the early 1980s.
    ${ }^{6}$ This study's projections assume that excess growth of Medicare Part A and other health care outlays (Medicare Parts B, C, and D and Medicaid) will grow at the same rate through 2030 as incorporated in CBO's 10-year budget projections (from February 2021). Excess health outlay's cost growth is assumed to be 1.87 percent through 2040 and then to decline linearly to zero by the year 2060.
    ${ }^{7}$ These assumption of continuing excess health care cost growth in the near term and its eventual abatement are similar to those made by other budget-projection studies, notably those of the Congressional Budget Office.

[^3]:    ${ }^{8}$ They include programs such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance (SNAP), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) and Medicare Prescription Drug program (Medicare Part D), Medicaid, education subsidies, and many others.
    ${ }^{9}$ See "CBO's Process for Developing and Reviewing Baseline Projections" https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53532. The CBO reports supplemental information on the budgetary effects of programs that require reauthorizations in the future.
    ${ }^{10}$ Per capita purchases growth is maintained at labor productivity growth only for non-Covid-19 related expenditures.

[^4]:    ${ }^{11}$ See the Appendix, section A5, for details on projecting U.S. GDP.

[^5]:    ${ }^{12}$ See United States Department of the Treasury (2022).

[^6]:    ${ }^{13}$ The Financial Report's estimate of the FI as a share of PVGDP is smaller because its estimate of the latter $\$ 1,724.4$ trillion - is considerably larger than our estimate of $\$ 1,300.3$ trillion. However, the Financial Report does not describe its GDP projection method.
    ${ }^{14}$ See Social Security Board of Trustees (2021), Table VI.F1. Again, however, FI as a share of PVGDP reported by the Social Security Trustees is smaller than ours because their estimate of the latter -- $\$ 1,698$ trillion is larger than our estimate of $\$ 1,300.3$. The Trustees Report does not contain a description of the methodology used to project GDP.
    ${ }^{15}$ See Annual Report of the Medicare Board of Trustees (2021), Table V.G2. The Medicare trustees' estimates for all parts of Medicare are qualified by the statement of actuarial opinion at the end of their Annual Report. That opinion strongly questions the sustainability of the current system of Medicare provider reimbursements, implying that official estimates severely understate the sizes of Medicare's 75 -year and infinite horizon financial shortfalls. However, Medicare's actuaries do not provide FI estimates in present valued dollars or as a share of PVGDP under their illustrative alternative scenario.

[^7]:    ${ }^{16}$ The CBO's 2051 projection of the ratio of debt held by the public to GDP is 202 percent (See CBO's Long Term Budget Projections, February 2021). The debt-to-GDP ratio for 2095 is not an unconditional forecast but a projection under the assumption that current laws and purchases policy are maintained through year 2095.
    ${ }^{17}$ When deficits continue to accrue beyond any finite time window, policy adjustments that achieve present-valued budget balance over that time window would be thrown out of balance simply because of the passage of time.

[^8]:    ${ }^{18}$ Taxes that are scheduled to expire under current fiscal laws are detailed in Appendix, section A6. Under CBO's methodology described earlier, projected budget effects of yet-to-be-reauthorized non-OASDHI expenditures are included in its 10 -year budget projections. Table A8.3 in Appendix section A8 lists the direct budget effects of reversing the expiration of TCJA provisions as estimated by PWBM staff.
    ${ }^{19}$ An alternative policy relative to current laws are likely to alter the time paths of households' labor supply and saving and, hence, tax bases, total federal revenues and annual deficits. Such feedback effects under the "no-sunset" policy are not included in the estimates reported in the text.

[^9]:    ${ }^{20}$ See footnote 16.
    ${ }^{21}$ Non-OASDHI projections of revenues and expenditures includes those for the Supplementary Medical Insurance (Medicare Parts B), Medicare Advantage (Part C) and the Medicare Prescription Drug program (Medicare Part D).
    ${ }^{22}$ Purchase of discretionary public goods and services (net of minor associated receipts) are held at levels projected by the CBO through year 2030. Purchases are distributed equally across the U.S. (projected) population and percapita amounts are assumed to increase at the rate of labor productivity growth after year 2030.

[^10]:    ${ }^{23}$ See Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991).
    ${ }^{24}$ It is possible to identify highest lifetime education because the PWBM's projection of the future population provides prospective life-histories of all simulated individuals.
    ${ }^{25}$ For example, distinguishing by gender alone would not capture (1) correlation between average transfers and longevity by race and education and (2) correlations between average taxes and longevity by race and education.

[^11]:    ${ }^{26}$ In this study population cohorts are distinguished by birth year, gender, race, and lifetime educational attainment. ${ }^{27}$ The latter calculation is extended sufficiently far into the future so that the present discounting procedure results in a stable value of $\mathrm{PVTF}_{t}^{c}$.
    ${ }^{28}$ The U.S. Treasury department reports this as "debt held by the public." It includes outstanding Treasury Bills, Notes, Bonds, Inflation protected, and other securities issued by the federal government and held by individuals, corporations, state and local governments, Federal Reserve banks, and foreign entities. As of year-end 2020 it stood at $\$ 21.6$ trillion.

[^12]:    ${ }^{29}$ No education attributes are assigned to children aged 0-17.

[^13]:    ${ }^{30}$ Government purchases of program-administrative services are not included in these accounts.
    ${ }^{31}$ Evaluating social insurance provision as a separate benefit is not within the scope of Generational Accounting.
    ${ }^{32}$ The term $\mathrm{NWTF}_{t}$, which shows the accumulated assets or debt of the program through year $t$, records the overall effect of past net payments of past and current generations.

[^14]:    ${ }^{33}$ The tax and benefit aggregates and 10 year projections that are allocated by the relative age-profiles are taken from the Congressional Budget Office's Budget and Economic Outlook, February, 2021.

[^15]:    ${ }^{34}$ Calculated from Bureau of Labor Statistics' report on multifactor productivity growth index 1987-2020. The BLS series used is Multifactor Productivity for Private Business Sector (NAICS 11-81), Index $2012=100.000$

[^16]:    ${ }^{35}$ The microsimulation's hours projections are predicated on many variables beyond race, gender and education $=$ such as legal status, years of residence in the United States, labor force status (full- and part year and full- and parttime), marital status, disability status, number of children, and so on. The projections shown in Figure A. 3 arise from hours regressions conditioned on these additional factors as well.
    ${ }^{36}$ The power regression $S=a t^{b}$, where S is the benefits-to-wages ratio and $t$ is the time trend variable, implemented on BEA data spanning the years 1982-2021 yields coefficient estimates $\hat{a}=0.1926$ and $\hat{b}=0.0558$.

[^17]:    ${ }^{37}$ Historical data on government capital depreciation and the government capital stock are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. The power regression implemented is $D^{g}=a t^{b}$, where the government-capitaldepreciation rate is $D^{g}$ and $t$ is the time trend variable. The estimated coefficients are $\hat{a}=0.0511$ and $\hat{b}=$ -0.0654 .
    ${ }^{38}$ The power regression in this case is $K W=a t^{b}$, where the ratio of government capital to government employee compensation is $K W$ and $t$ is the time trend variable. The estimated coefficients are $\hat{a}=1.2741$ and $\hat{b}=0.003$. ${ }^{39}$ The sensitivity of FI and the ratio of FI to PVGDP is discussed in the Appendix, section A11.

[^18]:    ${ }^{40}$ See the Appendix in Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (1991) for the derivation of the formulae for $Q$ and $\Delta$.
    ${ }^{41}$ The private capital stock reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis equals $\$ 31.8$ trillion making the capital loss for currently alive generations equal to $\$ 2.717$ trillion. The reduction in capital tax flows for future generations equals $\$ 32.6$ billion per year inflated according to the assumed rate of GDP inflation of 2.05 percent per year.

[^19]:    Table A9.1: The Composition of Generational Accounts for White College-Educated Males by Selected Years of Birth.
    (Present values in constant 2021 dollars)
    Source: Authors’ calculations.

    * Net of Supplementary Medical Insurance premiums.

[^20]:    ${ }^{42}$ The nominal discount rate used (excluding mortality discount) is 4.4 percent the product of a real discount rate of 2.3 percent per year and a 2.1 percent annual GDP inflation rate.

[^21]:    ${ }^{43}$ See Appendix section A12 for a detailed description of the effect of population aging on the fiscal imbalance under faster labor productivity and wage growth.

