We project that reversing the IEEPA tariffs will generate up to $175 billion in refunds. Unless replaced by another source, future tariff revenue collections will fall by half.

We project that the new DHS H-1B selection rule, going into effect in March 2026, will shift the H-1B visa allocation toward higher-paid and higher-education foreign-born workers, but by less than alternative designs being debated. Based on data from the current random lottery in the last five years, we estimate that the new DHS rule will have no significant impact on wages of U.S.-born workers, including non-college, college-educated, and STEM workers. Any reduction in competition from fewer STEM H-1Bs is offset by a reduction in productivity growth.

Over 700,000 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients lose legal status by the end of 2025, including 550,000 who are legally working. We estimate that TPS recipients contribute over $36 billion in annual GDP. Withdrawing their work authorization could add to labor shortages in construction, cleaning, and hospitality, especially in Florida, Texas and New York.

We project that corporate tax revenue will decrease by $276 billion over 10 years on a conventional basis due to changes in international tax provisions related to the Section 250 deduction under OBBBA.

The current Social Security program faces a significant shortfall, equal to 4.2 percent of all future covered payroll over the next 75 years. This shortfall persists under alternative and favorable projections of fertility, interest rates, immigration and the projected impact of AI on future wages.

PWBM estimates that the COVID-era Employee Retention Credit (ERC) will have cost more than $300 billion when the IRS finishes processing claims later in 2025, nearly four times the initial projected cost. Most of the ERC was paid retroactively, well after pandemic-related economic disruptions had ended, limiting its effectiveness as a worker retention incentive.

We estimate that AI will increase productivity and GDP by 1.5% by 2035, nearly 3% by 2055, and 3.7% by 2075. AI’s boost to annual productivity growth is strongest in the early 2030s but eventually fades, with a permanent effect of less than 0.04 percentage points due to sectoral shifts.

It is well known that mass deportation reduces aggregate economic variables like GDP due to scale effects. We project that deportation also reduces wages of high-skill workers, compromising 63% of workers. Still, authorized low-skilled workers can see their wages increase but only if the deportation policy is permanently sustained after 4 years. Even with new funds provided in the 2025 OBBBA, we estimate that permanent deportation would cost an additional $900 billion over the first 10 years.

We estimate that importers avoided 13.1 percent ($6.5 billion) of new tariffs by accelerating purchases and changing their purchasing patterns in response to the new tariff regime. Importers especially stockpiled pharmaceuticals and precious metals during 2025 Q1.

We estimate the reconciliation bill signed by President Trump increases primary deficits by $3.2 trillion over 10 years. The dynamic cost, including changes to the economy, is larger at $3.6 trillion. GDP falls by 0.3 percent in 10 years and 4.6 percent in 30 years.

We estimate the Senate-passed reconciliation bill increases primary deficits by $3.2 trillion over 10 years. The dynamic cost, including changes to the economy, is larger at $3.6 trillion. GDP falls by 0.3 percent in 10 years and 4.6 percent in 30 years.

Deporting unauthorized workers over 10 years cuts Social Security revenue, raises deficits by $133 billion (10 yrs) and $884 billion (30 yrs). The Trust Fund depletes 6 months earlier; 75-year deficit rises by 0.25% of payroll.

If spending and tax changes in the House-passed reconciliation bill are made permanent, federal debt increases by 9.9 percent in 10 years and 22.9 percent in 30 years. GDP decreases by 3.6 percent, and wages fall by 2.9 percent. Dynamic costs exceed conventional costs in the budget window.

We examine recent capital market dynamics in the context of budget reconciliation and trade policies. Understanding these dynamics requires modeling the interaction between microeconomic behavior and macroeconomic outcomes—an approach particularly well suited for the overlapping-generations lifecycle model.

We estimate the House-passed reconciliation bill increases primary deficits by $2.7 trillion over 10 years. GDP rises slightly, as labor supply and savings respond to a reduced social safety net, but the dynamic score is larger ($3.1 trillion) than the conventional.

If spending and tax changes in Reconciliation are made permanent, federal debt increases by 11.1 percent in 10 years and 24.3 percent in 30 years. GDP remains flat and wages fall by 0.5 percent. Dynamic costs exceed conventional costs in the budget window.

We estimate the House reconciliation bill increases primary deficits by $3.3 trillion over 10 years. Even so, GDP rises in the short and long term, as precautionary increases in labor supply and savings respond to a reduced social safety net.

Our previous analysis demonstrated that the Trump Administration's major tax proposals would require expiration if combined with the FY2025 House budget reconciliation. This brief considers several options to make the business tax extenders portion permanent using a combination of different horizons for spending cuts and individual tax extenders.

Under current law, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) will expire at the end of 2025, raising personal income tax rates back to 2017 levels. Some lawmakers propose extending the TCJA but with higher rates for high-income households. We consider three options.

Treasury data through April 28 shows that tax receipts are broadly in line with government projections made earlier this year, before the downsizing of the IRS was announced. Receipts from tariffs have significantly exceeded projections.

Many trade models fail to capture the full harm of tariffs. PWBM projects Trump’s tariffs (April 8, 2025) would reduce GDP by about 8% and wages by 7%. A middle-income household faces a $58K lifetime loss. These losses are twice as large as a revenue-equivalent corporate tax increase from 21% to 36%, an otherwise highly distorting tax.